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A B S T R A C T
Intuition suggests that for a conditional to be evaluated as true, there must be some kind of
connection between its component clauses. In this paper, we formulate and test a new psycho-
logical theory to account for this intuition. We combined previous semantic and psychological
theorizing to propose that the key to the intuition is a relevance-driven, satisﬁcing-bounded
inferential connection between antecedent and consequent. To test our theory, we created a
novel experimental paradigm in which participants were presented with a soritical series of
objects, notably colored patches (Experiments 1 and 4) and spheres (Experiment 2), or both
(Experiment 3), and were asked to evaluate related conditionals embodying non-causal in-
ferential connections (such as “If patch number 5 is blue, then so is patch number 4”). All four
experiments displayed a unique response pattern, in which (largely determinate) responses were
sensitive to parameters determining inference strength, as well as to consequent position in the
series, in a way analogous to belief bias. Experiment 3 showed that this guaranteed relevance can
be suppressed, with participants reverting to the defective conditional. Experiment 4 showed that
this pattern can be partly explained by a measure of inference strength. This pattern supports our
theory’s “principle of relevant inference” and “principle of bounded inference,” highlighting the
dual processing characteristics of the inferential connection.
1. Introduction
Conditionals are sentences of the form “If φ, [then] ψ,” with φ called “the antecedent” and ψ, “the consequent.”2 The functions of
conditionals are many and varied. For instance, we use “if” when we want to think hypothetically about non-actual possibilities
(Evans & Over, 2004); we use “if” to express causal relations (Cummins, 1995; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Over,
Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007) or probabilistic relations (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm,
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2003); and we use “if” to express pragmatic functions such as inducement or advice (Beller, Bender, & Kuhnmünch, 2005; Evans,
Neilens, Handley, & Over, 2008; Fillenbaum, 1976, 1986), and to generate novel normative rules (Elqayam, Thompson, Wilkinson,
Evans, & Over, 2015). It is no wonder, then, that the study of conditionals has engaged psychologists and philosophers alike. Without
a good theory of conditionals, we have no hope of understanding human reasoning or decision making. In this paper, we address what
is arguably themost central question in the study of conditionals, to wit, how the antecedent connects to the consequent. Speciﬁcally,
we will be concerned with how people’s judgments of the truth values of conditionals vary as a function of the link between
antecedent and consequent.
Intuitively, when we state a conditional, we expect that the antecedent would be relevant to the consequent. For example, there is
something odd about the following conditionals:
These conditionals appear odd in that the truth of their antecedent seems irrelevant to their consequent. There is no intelligible
notion of dependency in which Newton’s having gotten his best ideas while walking could be said to have depended on whether he
preferred apples over oranges, and similarly for (1b): whether the young Churchill considered a career as a sculptor can hardly have
depended on how he slept the night before D-Day.
Although both dependency and relevance have played key roles in psychological theories of conditionals (e.g., Evans & Over,
2004; Oaksford & Chater, 1994), there has been no systematic eﬀort to explore the psychological mechanisms that make sentences
such as
(2) If global warming continues, then parts of England will be ﬂooded.
seem plausible, where sentences such as (1a) and (1b) are not. In this paper, we will formulate and support a psychological account of
the relation between antecedent and consequent, to explain why conditionals like (1a) and (1b) strike us as odd, and what this tells us
about the psychological mechanisms underlying our understanding of conditionals. To do this, we propose a new theory that
combines insights from two main theoretical accounts: the philosophical account of inferentialism, and the psychological theory of
hypothetical thinking.
Where virtually all semantics of conditionals deﬁne the truth values of conditionals as functions of the truth values of the
conditionals’ antecedents and consequents (whether in the actual world or also in other possible worlds), inferentialism is the only
semantics that makes the existence of an inferential connection between antecedent and consequent a requirement for the truth of a
conditional. Inferentialism, in other words, builds the requirement of a connection into the meaning of the word “if,” thereby
straightforwardly accounting for the felt oddness of conditionals such as (1a) and (1b). It is not that these conditionals appear odd
because they are semantically defective. A sentence can appear perfectly ﬁne while still being semantically defective—the world may
simply fail to cooperate. According to inferentialism, (1a) and (1b) appear odd because they are semantically defective for a reason
that could easily have been avoided: it is (typically) under our control to compose conditionals whose component parts stand in an
inferential relationship to one another.
Hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2006, 2007a, 2010) is a dual-process theory positing two types of processes: fast, resource-
frugal, and intuitive processes, and slow, analytic processes. The former generate the most relevant, single mental representation; the
latter can then intervene to revise or even reject the initial representation, but this is a lazy, bounded process, meaning that the initial
representation tends to be adopted unless compelling reasons for revision exist.
Our blend of inferentialism with dual processing, and more speciﬁcally with hypothetical thinking theory, allows us to hypothesize
that the connection between antecedent and consequent is an inferential one, governed by relevance and bounded by satisﬁcing. We
state this theory in detail in a separate section, and present evidence in its favor from four experiments. But we begin by reviewing the
main extant psychological accounts of conditionals, with some reference along the way to relevant philosophical accounts as well.
2. Theories of conditionals
2.1. Mental model theory and the material conditional account
Philosophical theorizing about the semantics for conditionals has long been dominated by the material conditional account, as
advocated by, among others, Grice (1989), Jackson (1979), and Lewis (1976). According to this account, the truth conditions of a
conditional are those of the corresponding material conditional: “If φ ψ, ” is false if φ is true and ψ is false, and it is true in all other
cases. Although the material conditional has several advantages, it has also been criticized for sanctioning a number of counter-
intuitive inferences. Most famously, it gives rise to the so-called paradoxes of the material conditional: it validates the intuitively
invalid inference of “If φ ψ, ” from not-φ (e.g., the inference of “If Bill Gates went bankrupt, he is a billionaire” from “Bill Gates did not
go bankrupt”), as well as the intuitively equally invalid inference of “If φ ψ, ” from ψ (e.g., the inference of “If Bill Gates went
bankrupt, he is a billionaire” from “Bill Gates is a billionaire”). It is fair to say that this account is no longer considered as the received
doctrine among philosophers working on conditionals.
In psychology, the state of the art is similar, in that few psychological theories formulated past the turn of the century take the
material conditional account as their starting point. The one exception is mental model theory, in which the basic (i.e., abstract)
(1) a. If Isaac Newton preferred apples over oranges, then he got his best ideas while walking.
b. If Winston Churchill did not sleep the night before D-Day, then he considered a career as a sculptor early on in life.
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conditional corresponds to the material conditional (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). However, the theory is supplemented by se-
mantic and pragmatic modulations, so the material conditional only applies to a limited set of conditionals. We note that mental
model theory has recently been radically revised (Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015), rejecting the paradoxes of the
material conditional, although the new theory still needs more ﬂeshing out (Baratgin et al., 2015).
2.2. The Ramsey test and the Equation
Except for theories belonging to the material conditional family, almost all contemporary theories of conditionals, both in psy-
chology and in philosophy, build on the celebrated Ramsey test (Ramsey, 1929/1990). Supported by much psychological evidence
(Evans & Over, 2004), the Ramsey test posits that we determine whether to accept a given conditional by hypothetically adding its
antecedent to our stock of beliefs, making minimal changes (if necessary) to preserve consistency, and from the resulting (hy-
pothetical) perspective judging the acceptability of the conditional’s consequent. So, to evaluate (2), we hypothetically suppose that
global warming continues, and evaluate under this supposition the acceptability that parts of England will be ﬂooded.
Much theorizing constructed around the Ramsey test also subscribes to the Equation, which is suggested by the same footnote in
(Ramsey, 1929/1990) that presents the Ramsey test. According to the Equation, the probability of a conditional, φ ψPr(If , ), cor-
responds to the conditional probability ψ φPr( | ). For example, the probability that if global warming continues, parts of England will
be ﬂooded, is the probability of parts of England being ﬂooded given that global warming continues.
The one exception is Stalnaker’s (1968) possible worlds semantics, which was inspired by the Ramsey test but does not commit to
the Equation. According to Stalnaker, a conditional is true (false) if its consequent is true (false) in the closest possible world in which
its antecedent is true—provided there is a world in which its antecedent is true; otherwise it is vacuously true. We are not aware of
any psychological theory explicitly committed to Stalnaker’s semantics, although it is one possible interpretation of the psychological
suppositional conditional, which we describe in a separate section.
2.3. New paradigm and the equation
The Ramsey test and the Equation are both cornerstones of what has been dubbed “the New Paradigm” in psychology of reasoning
(Elqayam, 2017; Elqayam & Over, 2013; Manktelow, Over, & Elqayam, 2011; Over, 2011). The traditional paradigm in psychology of
reasoning focused on binary truth values (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Its underlying semantic theory was, ﬁttingly, the
binary material conditional. One of the hallmarks of the New Paradigm is that this binary approach is replaced with the more
psychological focus on uncertainty and subjective degrees of belief. In other words, reasoning in the New Paradigm is seen as
Bayesian, at least to some extent (Douven, 2016a; Elqayam & Evans, 2013).
Within the Equation-oriented camp in philosophy, there is a further distinction between non-propositionalism, according to which
conditionals do not express propositions and never have a truth value, and the three-value view. According to the latter, a conditional
is true if it has both a true antecedent and a true consequent; false if it has a true antecedent and a false consequent; and neither true
nor false (“void,” “indeterminate”) when its antecedent is false (Bennett, 2003; de Finetti, 1995). We are not aware of any psy-
chological theory fully committed to non-propositionalism; the three-value view is one of the possible semantic interpretations
underlying the psychological suppositional conditional.
2.4. Inferentialism
According to all of the truth-conditional semantics discussed so far, a suﬃcient condition for the truth of a conditional is that the
conditional’s antecedent and consequent are both true, no matter how internally unrelated these are. Thus, if Newton preferred
apples over oranges and he got his best ideas while walking, then (1a) is true according to those semantics. In this respect, these
semantics contrast sharply with the ﬁnal semantics to be reviewed here, to wit, inferentialism, which holds that, for a conditional to
be true, we should be able to infer its consequent from its antecedent (e.g., in philosophy, Barwise & Perry, 1983; Kratzer, 1986; Mill,
1843/1872; Ramsey, 1929/1990; Récanati, 2000; and in psychology, Braine, 1978; Braine & O’Brien, 1991).
As explained in the introduction, inferentialism makes it straightforward to account for our intuitions concerning (1a) and (1b).
Nevertheless, the inferentialist approach to the semantics of conditionals has never enjoyed wide popularity, chieﬂy because critics
have had no diﬃculty pointing at conditionals that are pre-theoretically true, yet whose consequent is seemingly not inferable from
their antecedent. Consider, for instance,
(3) If Betty misses her bus, she will be late for the movies.
It is easy enough to imagine circumstances under which we would regard this conditional as true, even though we can never rule out
that, through some freak accident, Betty makes it to the cinema in time even if she misses her bus. However, this objection has force
only if we interpret “inference” as meaning deductive inference. Krzyżanowska, Wenmackers, and Douven (2014) proposed a version
of inferentialism based on a notion of inference that goes beyond deduction: the argument from antecedent to consequent may
contain not only deductive but also abductive and inductive inferential steps, where (roughly) abductive inference is inference based
on explanatory considerations and inductive inference is inference based on statistical grounds. On this proposal,
(4) If Wilma and Fred are going to the gym together, they have settled their dispute.
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may be true because, given relevant background knowledge, Wilma and Fred having settled their dispute is the best explanation of
their going to the gym together. In the same way,
(5) If Barney works hard, he will pass the exam with ﬂying colors.
may be true because Barney is a very bright student and typically when such students work hard for an exam, they pass it with ﬂying
colors.
For our purposes, this proposal may be summarized as stating that a conditional is true if and only if there exists a strong enough
argument leading from its antecedent plus background knowledge to its consequent. What counts as strong enough may be subject to
cognitive and contextual variations and is beyond the scope of the present work; for now, we will stick with a Simonian notion of
satisﬁcing (Simon, 1982), on which we will elaborate later. The idea that arguments need not be deductively valid and that informal
arguments can still be judged for argument strength is fully compatible with the New Paradigm view of informal argumentation and
its signiﬁcance (e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Mercier & Sperber, 2011), although Krzyżanowska et al. (2014) do not commit
themselves to a Bayesian framework.3
3. The suppositional conditional and the defective truth table: The empirical evidence
As mentioned in the previous section, much relevant psychological work on conditionals has been carried out within the fra-
mework of the New Paradigm. In this section, we review the empirical evidence for the Ramsey test, the Equation, and the psy-
chological theories that accommodate them. Many contemporary psychological theories accept the Ramsey test and the Equation as
their starting point (see Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, for reviews). Evans and Over’s (2004) psychological theory of
the suppositional conditional is representative of this approach. Their proposal leaves the precise nature of the computational-level
theory open: Evans and Over suggested that psychological ﬁndings tell decisively against the material conditional account, but can ﬁt
either Stalnaker’s semantics or three-value theories (Baratgin, Over, & Politzer, 2013; Gilio & Over, 2012; Politzer, Over, & Baratgin,
2010; although we note that van Wijnbergen-Huitink, Elqayam, & Over, 2015, were later able to obtain direct empirical evidence for
the Equation and against Stalnaker’s account). They do not discuss inferentialism, but one could argue that position oﬀers another
way of ﬂeshing out the thought that evaluating a conditional crucially relies on suppositional thinking. We take this up again in the
next section.
Over the last decade or so, plenty of empirical support for the Equation has accumulated in the psychological literature, much of it
coming from the probabilistic truth table task. Participants in this task are presented with a conditional and asked to estimate its
probability. They are also given a probability distribution on the four truth table combinations (TT, TF, FT, and FF), or are asked to
generate one themselves in a separate task (Evans et al., 2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003; Over et al., 2007). Almost invariably, the
probability estimates of conditionals strongly correlate with the corresponding conditional probabilities computed on the basis of the
truth table cases—which is what one expects to ﬁnd if the Equation holds true (Douven & Verbrugge, 2010, 2013; Evans & Over,
2004; Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; Gauﬀroy and Barrioullet, 2009; Oaksford & Chater, 2003, 2007; Oberauer,
Weidenfeld, & Fischer, 2007; Over, Douven, & Verbrugge, 2013; Over & Evans, 2003; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2010; Politzer et al., 2010).
Of special interest to our context is the “defective” (or de Finetti) truth table (see Evans & Over, 2004, for a review; also Over &
Baratgin, 2017; Over & Cruz, 2017). In this task, participants are asked to evaluate the four truth table combinations of conditional
sentences. The idea goes back to Wason (1966), the founder of modern reasoning research, who suggested that reasoners regard the
false antecedent cases as irrelevant. The defective truth table is the one with the pattern TF##; that is to say, TT (the case in which
both the antecedent and consequent are true) is evaluated as true, TF as false, and both FT and FF as indeterminate. This pattern is
prevalent when participants are presented with arbitrary, abstract conditionals such as “If there is a King on one side of the card, then
there is a 3 on the other side.” It can also be identiﬁed with the probabilistic truth table task, and it remains reliable when participants
are asked to place bets rather than assign truth conditions (Baratgin et al., 2013; Politzer et al., 2010). The defective truth table is
related to cognitive proﬁciency: the pattern becomes more prevalent with age (Barrouillet, Gauﬀroy, & Lecas, 2008); in adults, it
correlates with general cognitive ability (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010); and it becomes more dominant as participants
accrue practice (Fugard et al., 2011).
The probabilistic truth table task (Over et al., 2007) provides some analogous ﬁndings for thematic materials, although the
comparison is not entirely straightforward. In this task, participants are given thematic conditionals—usually causal or diagnostic
conditionals—and asked to evaluate their probability; in a separate truth table task, they are provided with each of the truth table
cases and asked to evaluate their probabilities so that they sum to 100 percent. Typically, conditional probability computed based on
evaluations of the TT and TF cases is found to be the single strongest predictor of estimates of the probability of the conditional,
whereas measures based on the FT and FF cases—most importantly, the pΔ rule, which measures the diﬀerence between ψ φPr( | ) and
3 See Douven (2016b, chap. 2), for a rebuttal of potential objections to inferentialism. For some ﬁrst empirical results in support of an inferentialist semantics, see
Vidal and Baratgin (2017). Cruz, Over, Oaksford, and Baratgin (2016) suggest that the requirement of an inferential connection between antecedent and consequent
may be best accounted for in pragmatic terms. See Krzyżanowska, Collins, and Hahn (2017) for some evidence against this suggestion. In Douven, Elqayam, Singmann,
and van Wijnbergen-Huitink (2017), we give some reasons for holding that inferentialist intuitions are best explained as emanating from the semantics, and not from
the pragmatics, of conditionals. It is probably fair to say, though, that at the moment there is no conclusive argument in favor of either position. In any case, in the
present paper we explicitly remain noncommittal on whether inferentialist intuitions have a semantic rather than a pragmatic origin. See also Douven and
Krzyżanowska (in press) on some pitfalls of trying to distinguish experimentally semantic from pragmatic phenomena.
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ψ φPr( |not– )–are relatively poor predictors (see also Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014; but cf. Ohm & Thompson, 2006; Skovgaard-
Olsen, Singmann, & Klauer, 2016).
4. Toward a new psychological theory of conditionals
The previous review should make it obvious that no single existing theory covers the full range of intuitions and psychological
evidence. Speciﬁcally, inferentialism as proposed by Krzyżanowska et al. (2014) does not cover the defective truth table; and extant
psychological theories of conditionals, such as the psychological suppositional conditional (Evans & Over, 2004), do not suﬃciently
cover inferentialist intuitions. Our aim in this paper is to construct and test a psychological theory which covers both. To do this, we
will draw on features from inferentialism, combined with features taken from the psychological suppositional conditional, and its
parent theory, hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2006, 2007a; Evans & Over, 2004). Thus, our theoretical account integrates
algorithmic and computational aspects (in the sense of Marr, 1982)—processing and representational features on the one hand, and
formal (semantic or pragmatic) features on the other hand, respectively. We call our theory “Hypothetical Inferential Theory,” or HIT,
for short.
Dual process theories of higher cognition (for reviews see Evans, 2007a; Evans & Stanovich, 2013) posit a qualitative diﬀerence
between two types of processes: intuitive, resource-frugal processes (sometimes called “Type 1” or “System 1”); and analytic, eﬀortful
processes (“Type 2” or “System 2”), which draw heavily on attentional and working memory resources. Dual process approaches have
become a mainstay of the New Paradigm in psychology of reasoning (Elqayam & Over, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2012, 2014). We
will focus in particular on hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2006, 2007a), a dual process theory that suggests that hypothetical,
eﬀortful thinking is mainly invoked in novel situations which call for mental simulation of possibilities. Type 1 processes focus
attention on the most relevant possibility or (epistemic) mental model (relevance principle), and only one model (singularity principle).
The ensuing mental representation is accepted as default (satisﬁcing principle), unless there is a good reason to reject it—in which case
Type 2 processes get involved in revising or rejecting the default.4
According to the psychological suppositional conditional (Evans & Over, 2004), the Ramsey test involves both Type 1 and Type 2
processes. The most prominent Type 1 process involved in it is the if-heuristic (an idea going back to Evans, 1989). This is a special
case of the relevance principle, in which the word “if” provides a relevance cue which focuses attention on the possibility that the
antecedent is true (see also Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016). The if-heuristic thus provides the processing account of the attentional
eﬀects triggered by the Ramsey test. This gives rise to the defective truth table, because the attentional focus on true antecedent cases
renders false antecedent cases irrelevant. Type 2 processes are invoked when the conditional triggers hypothetical thinking, that is,
mental simulation of possibilities. The relevance principle will always play a role in generating the mental model, but Type 2
processing might be involved as well in evaluating it, especially when the situation is novel.
We propose that, for conditionals, the relevant mental representation is by default the one in which there is an inferential relation
between antecedent and consequent. As argued in Krzyżanowska et al. (2014), this inferential link from antecedent to consequent need
not be a deductive one. We propose a psychological mechanism: According to the satisﬁcing principle, the link need only be strong
enough, in the sense of being subjectively supported. For example, it can be supported by informal argumentation such as described by
Hahn and Oaksford (2007); (see also Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011) by heuristic or pragmatic cues, as suggested by Evans and Over
(2004); or by some form of inference to the best explanation (Douven, 2013, 2017a, 2017c; Douven & Mirabile, 2018; Douven &
Schupbach, 2015). On the computational level, the semantic output of these cues often takes the shape of inductive or abductive
inference, or even deductive inference. When relevance cues fail, the result is a truth value gap, accounting for the defective truth
table. In this regard, our proposal echoes the psychological suppositional conditional; what our theory adds is the two novel hy-
potheses, that relevance takes the shape of inferential connection, and that the strength of this connection is bounded by satisﬁcing.
We will call these “the principle of relevant inference” and “the principle of bounded inference,” respectively.
On the computational level, our proposal is compatible with a truth value gap semantics, in which a conditional is true if there is a
strong enough argument from antecedent (plus background knowledge) to consequent; false if there is an argument connecting
antecedent and consequent, but the argument is weak, or there is an argument (perhaps only a weak one) from the antecedent to the
negation of the consequent; and neither true nor false if there is no inferential connection at all. (See Douven, 2016b, chap. 2, for
more on this.) We note that, purely on the semantic level, inferentialism needs to accommodate the defective truth table anyway, in
order to achieve descriptive adequacy. Once again, whether inferentialism, thus expanded, is tenable as a semantic theory we leave as
a question for future research.
5. Experimental paradigm and hypotheses
Our theory construes the defective truth table as, in part, a product of failed inferential relevance between antecedent and
consequent. It follows that, when a relevant inferential connection between antecedent and consequent is certain to exist, the patterns
associated with the defective truth table should disappear or at least be substantially attenuated. To test our hypotheses, we therefore
created a novel experimental task, the soritical truth table task, in which inferential relevance is guaranteed. Imagine that you are
given a soritical series of color patches, the patches being numbered 1 through 14 and ordered from left to right. The series begins
4 Although we only explicitly draw on the relevance and satisﬁcing principles, these principles work in tandem with the singularity principle. Only a single relevant
representation is generated, and people satisﬁce by sticking to this single model unless compelled to replace it.
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with a clearly blue patch—patch number 1—on the left, then gradually becomes more greenish as one progresses to the right, with
adjacent patches being almost indistinguishable in color, and it ends with a clearly green patch—patch number 14—on the right (see
Fig. 5.1).
You are now given a conditional sentence describing a relation between two of these patches, for example, “If patch number 6 is
green, so is patch number 9.” The positions in the series of the antecedent and consequent patches (6 and 9, respectively) jointly
establish the “direction” of the inferential connection: in this case, because the soritical series goes from blue on the left to green on
the right, the direction is (what we call) congruent, making the conditional true, according to inferentialism. It does not matter that
patch number 6 is actually blue—that is, that the antecedent is false. The antecedent is still relevant because it provides necessary
information about the direction and distance of the inferential connection. More generally, what we are asked to assume about any of
the patches will, given what we know about the soritical series, be relevant to what we may infer about the color of the other patches
(albeit with varying degrees of relevance). This is what we mean by “guaranteed inferential relevance”—that what is asserted in the
antecedent is always relevant to the question of the truth of the conditional, regardless of whether the assertion is true.
The experiments we will report used soritical tasks like this one to elicit truth table judgments from participants. Participants were
given the usual three response options, “True”/“False”/“Neither true nor false.”We varied the distance (either adjacent or removed)
and direction (either congruent or incongruent) of the consequent patch relative to the antecedent patch. In Experiment 1, for control
purposes, we used three diﬀerent presentation modes: verbal description only, visual presentation of soritical series throughout the
test, and visual presentation of series through explanation but not during evaluation. Experiment 2 used a similar task, but with a
diﬀerent soritical series; Experiment 3 combines the two soritical series employed in Experiments 1 and 2; and in Experiment 4 we
added a separate inference strength task. HIT generates several testable and novel predictions for this experimental paradigm, which
we now specify.
5.1. If-heuristic override hypothesis
The soritical truth table task is designed to override the if-heuristic, because the context provides a powerful relevance cue to the
contrary. Based on the principle of relevant inference, we hypothesize that the view or description of the series, aided by a soritical
uncertainty, will focus participants’ attention on the relationship between the antecedent and consequent patch, overriding the if-
heuristic and hence directing participants’ attention away from the truth value of the antecedent. If this is correct, we should see a
minimal occurrence of defective truth table patterns in our data, and overall a very low prevalence of “Neither true nor false”
responses. We explicitly test the if-heuristic override hypothesis in Experiment 3.
The if-heuristic is not without its critics; for example, Oaksford and Stenning (1992) argue that it is descriptive rather than
explanatory. Here we use the term if-heuristic in the relatively uncontroversial sense of an attentional cue which focuses attention on
the true-antecedent cases and away from the false-antecedent ones. We take this up again in the General Discussion.
5.2. Inferential strength hypothesis: The eﬀects of distance and direction
HIT predicts that people judge a conditional to be true when they can satisﬁce on a strong enough argument leading from
antecedent to consequent (relative to their background knowledge). To see what the requirement of an inferential connection
amounts to speciﬁcally for the conditionals that we used as stimuli, note that there are two parameters that allow us to make an
inference from the antecedent to the consequent, to wit, direction and distance. For instance, consider:
(6) a. If patch number 8 is green, so is patch number 11.
b. If patch number 8 is green, so is patch number 7.
Pre-theoretically, these conditionals strike us as true. And from an inferentialist perspective, they certainly are: (6a) because patches
to the right of any given patch are greener than that patch, so the conditional is in the “right” (i.e., congruent) direction; and (6b)
because patches number 8 and number 7 are adjacent, and so—given that adjacent patches diﬀer almost imperceptibly in col-
or—whatever is true for the color of patch number 8 can reasonably be expected to be true for the color of patch number 7.
There is a diﬀerence, however, between direction and distance.5 Direction is a deductively valid cue: given what we know about
the series, it is enough to know that patch number 8 is green to infer that patch number 11, which is in the congruent direction, is also
green. By contrast, distance is a non-deductive cue, a parameter related to informal argument strength. In the case of (6b), distance is
a strong cue, given that, within the series, adjacent patches have very similar colors. Speciﬁcally, on the supposition that patch
number 8 is green, we have a strong warrant to believe that patch number 7 is green, too, even though the warrant is not as strong as
in the case of (6a), in which the inferential connection is deductive in nature. Still, the non-deductive cue in (6b) is strong enough to
satisﬁce on. Hence, argument strength in our experimental paradigm is operationalized as distance and direction eﬀects—deductive
Fig. 5.1. Soritical color series.
5 We thank Rakefet Ackerman for drawing our attention to this distinction.
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and non-deductive argument strength parameters, respectively.
Therefore, we expected direction to exert a main eﬀect on truth evaluations of the conditionals: the consequent patch would
either be positioned congruently, in the direction of the named color, strengthening the inference; or incongruently, away from the
named color, weakening the inference. We also expected a main eﬀect of distance, working as a probabilistic cue, such that the closer
the distance between the patches, the stronger the inference, and hence the greater the prevalence of “True” responses.
Finally, we had an exploratory hypothesis for an interaction of direction with distance. If deductive and non-deductive cues
interact, we could expect, for conditionals with the consequent patch on the congruent side, more “True” responses the greater the
distance between antecedent and consequent, whereas the opposite should be observed for conditionals whose consequent patch is on
the incongruent side. We left this hypothesis open as exploratory because we had no grounds to expect either an interaction between
deductive and non-deductive cues, or its lack thereof.
5.3. Belief bias hypothesis
If the relation between antecedent and consequent is inferential, we would also expect it to be sensitive to the same psychological
patterns that aﬀect inferential processes in general. One of the most prominent and well-documented eﬀects is belief bias, the
tendency to be inﬂuenced by prior belief when drawing an inference, regardless of validity (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Klauer,
Musch, & Naumer, 2000). Prior belief has a robust eﬀect on both deductive and non-deductive inference (Thompson & Evans, 2012);
in many if not all cases, this eﬀect centers on the believability of the conclusion: ceteris paribus, arguments whose conclusions are
deemed believable are more often endorsed than arguments whose conclusions are deemed unbelievable.
Recall that HIT postulates an inferential connection, with the contextualized antecedent playing the role of a premise of an
argument and the consequent playing the role of its conclusion. If participants in our task are susceptible to belief bias, we would
expect them to base their inference at times on the truth value of the consequent, regardless of the inferential connection between
antecedent and consequent—the analogue to belief bias in our experimental paradigm. For example, consider this conditional:
(7) If patch number 13 is green, so is patch number 11.
It is suﬃcient that patch number 11 is close to the green end of the series—no real inference is required, just considering the
consequent patch position. Hence, we also expected an eﬀect of consequent rank (i.e., the position of the consequent patch in the
soritical color series) on the probability of judging a conditional to be true.
Belief bias is typically made up of three eﬀects: a main eﬀect of argument validity (or, in the case of informal reasoning, argument
strength); a main eﬀect of believability; and a belief× validity interaction, in which belief aﬀects invalid (or weak) inferences more. If
the analogy holds, we should expect an interaction between believability as measured by consequent rank, and the two argument
strength parameters, distance and direction. Speciﬁcally, we would expect consequent rank to have a stronger eﬀect where distance
and direction provide no reliable cues to argument strength, as in the example above. (Note that this prediction is not as strong as the
prediction for a main eﬀect of consequent rank, as at least one study—Thompson and Evans, 2012—found no interaction eﬀect for
informal reasoning tasks.)
6. Experiment 1
6.1. Method
PARTICIPANTS
Seven hundred and four participants were recruited for a modest fee via the crowd-sourcing platform CrowdFlower (http://www.
crowdﬂower.com), which directed them to the experiment on the Qualtrics platform (http://www.qualtrics.com). All participants
were from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States. Data from participants who did not complete the study as
well as from nonnative speakers of English were excluded from the analysis. This left us with 588 participants.
Participants in the visual presentation conditions were asked to classify the color of the patches (more details below). The
participants who were asked to classify the color ( =N 397) spent on average 381 s on the study (SD: 30 s); the participants in the
description condition who did not have to classify the color ( =N 191) spent on average 760 s on the study (SD: 408 s). (There is
nothing surprising to the fact that the participants in the visual presentation conditions, which had to answer an extra question, spent
on average less time on the study. The visual presentation of the soritical color series presented in Fig. 5.1 made the task easier.) For
the analysis, we excluded from each group the fastest 5 percent responders as well as the slowest 5 percent responders. This left us
with 532 participants: 359 in the visual presentation conditions, and 173 in the description condition. Of these 532 participants, 427
had a university education, while 105 had only a high school or secondary school education. The mean age of the participants was
34 years (±13). The remaining analysis and description is based on those 532 participants. The attrition rate (24 percent) is not
unusual for web-based studies.
DESIGN
We used a × ×3 2 2 between-participants design with three levels of color series presentation (“description,” “in sight,” and “out of
sight”), two levels of consequent spread (“small” and “large”), and two levels of color (“blue” and “green”), resulting in twelve groups
in total. Participants were randomly assigned to the groups. The number of participants per group is given in Table 6.1. Each
participant judged 22 conditionals, described in more detail below, with diﬀerent values of direction and distance.
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The color condition determined the value of X in schematic sentence (8) below (see Materials section) and was consistent for all
conditionals. Thus, participants in the green condition were presented with conditionals which consistently referred to green, and
participants in the blue condition were presented with conditionals which consistently referred to blue.
The 22 conditionals per participant resulted from a not fully-orthogonal combination of three within-subject factors antecedent,
direction, and range. We used six diﬀerent values for the antecedent i in (8): 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13. For each of those antecedents, we
presented either three (for antecedents 2 and 13) or four (for the remaining antecedents 7, 8, 9, and 10) diﬀerent consequent values j.
More speciﬁcally, for the latter four antecedents we presented two consequents in the congruent direction (the consequent patch to
the left, bluer side of the antecedent patch in the blue condition and to the right, greener side of the antecedent patch in the green
condition) and two consequents in the incongruent direction (the consequent patch to the right of the antecedent patch in the blue
condition and to the left of the antecedent patch in the green condition). For one of the congruent patches in each direction the range
was “near” whereas for the other the range was “far.” The near range was always 1 step away. The value of the far range depended on
the spread between-participants condition. In the small spread condition, the far patch was 2 steps away, whereas in the large spread
condition, the far patch was 3 steps away. Note that for the two outer antecedents (i.e., 2 and 13) the far patches could not be realized
for all directions (e.g., a patch to the left of 2 that is either 2 or 3 steps away would be outside of the color series).
To illustrate the design, three of the twelve groups—participants in the green color and small spread conditions—received conditionals of
the forms “If patch number i is green, so is patch number −i 1,” “If patch number i is green, so is patch number −i 2,” “If patch number i is
green, so is patch number +i 1,” and “If patch number i is green, so is patch number +i 2,” for ∈i {7, 8, 9, 10}; for =i 2, they received
conditionals of the ﬁrst, third, and fourth forms (i.e., − +i i1, 1, and +i 2); and for =i 13, they received conditionals of the ﬁrst, second,
and third form (i.e., − −i i1, 2, and +i 1). The 22 conditionals were presented on the same screen in an individually randomized order.
The presentation condition determined how participants were presented with the color series. Close to one third of the partici-
pants—the participants in the description condition—only received the following description:
Imagine a series of 14 color patches, numbered 1 through 14, and ordered from left to right. The series begins with a clearly blue
patch—patch number 1—on the left. The patches then gradually become more greenish as we progress to the right, with adjacent
patches being almost indistinguishable in color. The series ends with a clearly green patch—patch number 14—on the right.
Participants in the two visual presentation conditions—the in-sight and out-of-sight conditions—were shown the series of color
patches displayed in Fig. 5.1. For the participants in the in-sight condition, the series was left in sight while they evaluated the
conditionals. The participants in the out-of-sight condition were shown the series at the beginning but it was no longer in sight when
they evaluated the conditionals; there was also no possibility for those participants to return to the screen with the color series. The
series was presented in constant order, always from the blue left to the green right.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
All materials were in English, the participants’ native language, and shown on screen. Participants were asked to evaluate con-
ditionals about the series of fourteen color patches shown in Fig. 5.1. The colors of the patches in that series were chosen along a
constant line of lightness =L 30 and such that there is a subjective separation between adjacent patches of =∗EΔ 11.2 as measured in
CIELUV coordinates (see Fairchild, 2013, for details). The conditionals that participants were asked to judge were all of the form
(8) If patch number i is X, so is patch number j.
Participants were presented with three response options to judge the truth of each conditional, “True,” “False,” and “Neither true nor
false.”
All 359 participants who had been shown the series of color patches (i.e., participants in the in-sight and out-of-sight conditions)
were asked to classify the colors in the soritical series in a separate task, after they had evaluated the conditionals. They were shown
the color series again, and on the same screen were asked to indicate of each patch whether it was blue, green, or borderline blue/
green, again in an individually randomized order. The responses to this question are displayed in Fig. 6.1.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
To test the predictions from HIT, we used two variables, direction and distance, where direction had two levels, “congruent” and
“incongruent,” and distance was determined by spread and range: When range was near, distance was always 1, independent of the
value of the spread factor; when range was far, distance was either 2 (if spread was small) or 3 (if spread was large). Thus, distance
Table 6.1
Number of participants per between-participants condition.
Presentation
Description In sight Out of sight
Spread Small 49/37 45/55 47/44
Large 43/44 39/41 46/42
Note. The ﬁrst value in each cell denotes the number of participants in the blue color condition, the second value (i.e.,
after the slash) the number of participants in the green color condition. (See the text for an explanation of the factors.)
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varied both within and between participants, as range was varied within participants (i.e., participants saw both items in near and far
range) and spread between participants (i.e., it was either small or large). As we did not speciﬁcally predict a linear or quadratic trend
of distance, we treated distance as a categorical variable. For reasons given below, we compared HIT with models predicting eﬀects of
either consequent alone or of antecedent and consequent together. For these models, we used numeric variables with the patch
number of antecedent and/or consequent centered at the midpoint of the scale.
Including all four independent variables describing the within-participants design (i.e., direction, distance, antecedent, and con-
sequent) in one analysis was not possible as they are collinear; formally speaking, the matrix of a model with all four independent
variables would be rank deﬁcient. However, both a model with antecedent and consequent as independent variables and a model with
direction, distance, and either antecedent or consequent as independent variables is perfectly possible. In addition to this, either type of
model contains diﬀerent information in the independent variables. Choosing between antecedent and consequent for the latter model
only leads to a diﬀerent parameterization of an otherwise equivalent model. Consequently, the results section is split into two parts: in
the ﬁrst, we compare the HIT model with two independently motivated models employing a model selection approach (e.g., Zucchini,
2000); in the second part, we investigate the HIT model further to assess whether the speciﬁc predictions are supported.
We analyzed our data using two binomial variables. In a ﬁrst step, we only considered “Neither true nor false” versus other
responses. In a second step, we only considered the other responses from the ﬁrst step analyzing “True” versus “False” responses (i.e.,
excluding trials with “Neither true versus false” responses). In this way, we transformed a multinomial variable with three categories
into two binomial variables (i.e., we analyzed the data as nested dichotomies; Fox, 2008). However, our design presented another
statistical challenge. The models we compared all predict eﬀects of within-participants variables such as antecedent or consequent
patch or direction, which prohibits the use of standard statistical procedures for binomial variables such as logistic regression or
χ2-tests. These standard procedures assume independent and identically distributed responses, an assumption violated for within-
subject factors. To overcome this problem, we employed an analysis based on generalized linear mixed models (GLMM; e.g., Jaeger,
2008), a type of repeated-measures logistic regression (see the supplemental materials for details).
We relegate a thorough discussion of the presentation factor (with levels “description,” “in sight,” and “out of sight”) to the
supplemental materials, as its eﬀect on the results did not aﬀect the conclusions. Our analysis was performed on the × =532 22 11,704
individual responses.
6.2. Results and discussion
6.2.1. Indeterminate responses
Overall, participants classiﬁed 49.1 percent of the conditionals as true, 40.4 percent as false, and 10.5 percent as neither true nor
false. However, the aggregate value for “Neither true nor false” does not adequately reﬂect the interindividual variability for the
indeterminate responses, as 55 percent of the participants never chose this response option. Fig. 6.2 displays the distribution of the
individual response proportions showing this clearly. Furthermore, only one out of 532 participants always responded with “Neither
true nor false” (four participants always responded with “True” and ﬁve always with “False”). The results are even more striking
when we examine speciﬁcally the false antecedent cases, the cases traditionally evaluated as indeterminate in classic truth table tasks.
This is possible for the participants in the visual test conditions, who were also asked to classify the color patches as “green,” “blue,”
or “borderline.” Out of 1915 responses to conditionals with false antecedents, only 116 (6 percent) were indeterminate. These results
strongly agree with our if-heuristic override hypothesis.
6.2.2. “True” versus “False” responses
Our main interest was the predictions concerning the rates of “True” versus “False” responses. Mean response proportions as a
function of the independent variables relevant for HIT are displayed in Fig. 6.3. An eyeball test seems to conﬁrm an eﬀect of both
inference strength and belief bias in line with the predictions of HIT.
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Model selection. We started by ﬁtting a GLMM for HIT, which included the variables deemed relevant: ﬁxed eﬀects for direction,
distance, and consequent, plus all their interactions. We also ﬁtted a consequent-only model, to represent pure belief bias eﬀects, and
an antecedent–consequent model, to represent a generic non-inferential semantic approach, based purely on the truth values of
antecedent and consequent (see Section 2). For a fair comparison, all models contained ﬁxed eﬀects for the control variables color,
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presentation, and spread (where possible) plus full interactions with the relevant variables (note that the presence or absence of these
variables did not aﬀect the conclusions).
Model selection results are displayed in Table 6.2 and were straightforward. As could be expected from the descriptive results, the
HIT model clearly provided the best account in terms of both AIC and BIC.6 While the antecedent–consequent model provided the
second best account, its performance was dramatically worse, with =ΔAIC 721.
Analysis of HIT model. Next we tested the speciﬁc predictions of HIT. To this end, we estimated p-values for all eﬀects of the HIT
model (the full results can be found in Table 1 in the supplemental materials). The inferential strength hypothesis was supported by a
main eﬀect of direction, = <χ p(1) 201.66, .00012 , indicating that conditionals with consequent patches on the congruent side were
almost unanimously judged to be true (estimated marginal mean on the response scale =[EMM] .93),7 whereas conditionals with
consequent patches on the incongruent side were judged to be true in less than 20 percent of the cases ( =EMM .18). We found the
predicted main eﬀect of distance, = <χ p(2) 80.00, .00012 , indicating that conditionals with consequent patches one step away
( =EMM .86) were more likely to be judged “True” than conditionals with consequent patches two steps away ( =EMM .60, odds ratio
= = <z p[OR] 4.26, 6.24, .0001), which in turn were more likely to be judged “True” than conditionals with consequent patches three
steps away ( = = = <z pEMM .35, OR 2.70, 4.46, .0001). The exploratory prediction of interaction of direction with distance was not
supported, = =χ p(2) 0.50, .782 .
We also found strong support for the predicted belief bias eﬀect. First, we found the analogue of the main eﬀect of belief, an eﬀect
of consequent (i.e., an interaction of consequent with color), = <χ p(1) 356.10, .00012 . The slope in the blue condition was clearly
negative, = −b 0.86blue , 95% CI − −[ 0.99, 0.73], whereas the slope in the green condition was clearly positive, =b 0.71green , 95% CI
[0.59, 0.83]. Second, we also found evidence for an analogue of the believability × validity interaction, namely, that the eﬀect of
consequent was stronger for weaker inferences as indicated by a signiﬁcant three-way interaction of direction × color × consequent,
= =χ p(1) 7.69, .0062 . Follow-up analyses further conﬁrmed the predictions: the slopes for consequent in the congruent conditions
( = −b 0.76blue , 95% CI − −[ 0.92, 0.59], and =b 0.61green , 95% CI [0.47, 0.75]) tended to be smaller than the slopes in the incongruent
conditions ( = −b 0.97blue , 95% CI − −[ 1.13, 0.81], and =b 0.80green , 95% CI [0.65, 0.95]), both >z| | 2.1, both =p .055. Fig. 6.4 shows the
ﬁxed and random eﬀects model estimates of this interaction which reveal that, although there is considerable individual variation,
the pattern was quite consistent.8 Given the absence of the direction × distance interaction, the absence of the direction × distance ×
color × consequent interaction, = =χ p(2) 3.09, .212 , was entirely unsurprising.
7. Experiment 2
Consider the following sentences:
Of these sentences, (9a) is ordinarily classiﬁed as an indicative conditional while (9b) and (9c) are classiﬁed as subjunctives, with (9c)
counting as a special kind of subjunctive, usually called “counterfactual,” given that it pragmatically implicates its antecedent (and in
Table 6.2
Model comparison of GLMMs on “True” versus “False” responses for Experiment 1.
Model Kf Kr LL AIC ΔAIC BIC ΔBIC
HIT 72 8/28 −3746.02 7708.03 0.00 8491.77 0.00
Consequent 24 2/1 −5526.32 11106.64 3398.61 11302.58 2810.80
Antecedent–consequent 48 4/6 −4156.75 8429.49 721.46 8850.39 358.62
Kf is the number of ﬁxed eﬀect parameters, Kr the number of random eﬀect parameters (number of random slopes+ random intercept/number of correlations among random
eﬀects), and LL the maximum log-likelihood of each model. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion and BIC the Bayesian Information Criterion, two indices for model selection
that take model ﬁt (i.e.,−2 × LL) and model complexity (i.e., number of estimated parameters, and for BIC also sample size) into account. ΔAIC and ΔBIC are the values for
each model minus the smallest AIC or BIC value. Models with smaller indices provide a more parsimonious (i.e., better) description of the data.
(9) a. If Dino wins the lottery, he will quit his job.
b. If Dino were to win the lottery, he would quit his job.
c. If Dino had won the lottery, he would have quit his job.
6 Because we do not assume that the true model is among our candidate models, we have a preference for AIC over BIC (see Yang, 2005).
7 Marginal means were estimated at the midpoint of consequent (i.e., at 7.5), p-values of follow-up tests were corrected for each signiﬁcant eﬀect separately using a
generalized version of the Bonferroni–Holm method (see supplemental materials for details).
8 Taking a step back from the predictions, inspection of Fig. 6.4 also reveals a main eﬀect of color, = <χ p(1) 15.47, .00012 , as the y-axis position with which the
midpoint of consequent is crossed diﬀers between the blue and the green condition. In other words, the probability of a “True” response at the midpoint is higher in the
blue ( =EMM .74) than in the green condition ( =EMM .50). This eﬀect is a consequence of the perceived asymmetry of the color series in the visual presentation
conditions, as is evident from Fig. 6.1. Hence, it can be explained by a color × presentation interaction, = =χ p(2) 13.29, .0012 . Follow-up contrasts on the interaction
revealed the to-be-expected pattern: While the diﬀerence between the blue and the green condition is signiﬁcant in the two visual presentation conditions
( = =EMM .76 and .34; EMM .73 and .35in-sight out-of-sight ), both OR >5.1, both <p .0006, no such eﬀect was observed in the description condition, in which no
asymmetry could be expected ( =EMM .74 and .79), = =pOR 0.74, .51. Note that this interaction also subsumed a main eﬀect of presentation, = =χ p(2) 11.88, .0032 .
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fact also its consequent) to be false. As stated at the outset (note 1), the present paper is exclusively concerned with indicative
conditionals.9 However, consider
(10) If patch number 2 is green, so is patch number 3.
As can be seen in Fig. 6.1, virtually all participants in the in-sight and out-of-sight conditions judged patch number 2 to be blue; and
the participants in the description condition, based on the information they were provided, will have had the reasonable expectation
that this patch was blue. So, although (10), like all conditionals in our materials, is grammatically an indicative conditional, there is a
legitimate concern that at least some participants will have read it and other conditionals with clearly false antecedents as coun-
terfactuals and thus as subjunctives, and that this reading may have aﬀected the outcomes of Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 was designed to address this concern, by using a soritical series which does not allow with any certainty the
attribution of truth values to the antecedents or consequents of the conditionals concerning the series. Instead of a series of color
patches, we used the series of spheres shown in Fig. 7.1, where the context provided only information suﬃcient to judge the relative
rather than absolute sizes of the spheres; all conditionals we used were to the eﬀect that if a given sphere in the series was large, then
so was another given sphere in the series. The context did not support a counterfactual interpretation of these conditionals, given that
neither the conditionals’ antecedents nor their consequents could be said to be false with any degree of conﬁdence. For example,
although sphere number 14 is clearly larger than sphere number 13, it is impossible to say that it is large—for all we know, all 14
spheres are exceedingly small, having been produced by a miniaturist artist under a microscope. Nevertheless, the series still supports
inferential connections between the antecedent and consequent of the relevant conditionals.
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Fig. 7.1. Soritical series of spheres.
9 As noted in Douven (2016b), it may not take too much eﬀort to tweak inferentialism—one of the main pillars of HIT—to make it apply to indicative and
subjunctive conditionals alike. Thus generalized, inferentialism might well serve as a foundation for a version of HIT that covers subjunctive conditionals as well. Here,
however, we ﬂag a possible extension of HIT in this direction only as an avenue for future research.
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7.1. Predictions
Our predictions were similar to the ones we had in Experiment 1, albeit with some diﬀerences. We predicted a replication of the
inferential strength eﬀect, articulated as main eﬀects of direction and distance. We left the distance × direction interaction as an ex-
ploratory hypothesis again. We also predicted a consequent eﬀect (our belief bias analogue), although we expected it not to be as strong as
in Experiment 1. This is because sphere size in this series is purely relative, and none of the spheres can be said to be small or large; hence,
there is little belief to bias the inference. As a minor prediction, we predicted a consequent × direction eﬀect, a replication of the same
eﬀect from Experiment 1. As before, this prediction is less ﬁrm because believability × validity interaction is not universal in belief bias.
7.2. Method
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-six participants were recruited in the same manner as in Experiment 1. We excluded from analysis data from the 5 percent
slowest and 5 percent fastest participants, then from non-native speakers of English, participants who did not have normal or
corrected to normal vision, color blind or dyslexic participants, and participants who failed either of two validation questions. The
ﬁrst validation question (following Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014) appeared at the end of the demographic
section. Participants were given a list of hobbies and were asked, “Below is a list of hobbies. If you are reading these instructions
please write ‘I read the instructions’ in the ‘other’ box.” Data from participants who left the box empty or speciﬁed hobbies were
excluded. The second validation question, taken from Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, and Musch (2013) was placed at the end of the
study, and asked participants to state if they had responded seriously to the questions in the experiment. We excluded data from
participants who responded with a “No.” Lastly, we excluded data from participants who participated in the study using a handheld
device such as a smartphone (information about the device was obtained from their browser information, provided by Qualtrics). This
left us with 39 participants. These participants spent on average 302 s on the experiment (SD: 100 s). Thirty of them had a university
education and 9 had only a high school or secondary school education. Their mean age was 41 years (±11).
DESIGN AND MATERIALS
We used the soritical series of 14 spheres shown in Fig. 7.1. Participants were given the following instructions:
At the top of the screen you see a series of 14 spheres. These spheres are all aligned, one lying next to the other. Imagine that you
see the spheres from an unknown distance. They can be very far away or quite nearby, although all are the same distance from
you. You do not know anything about the absolute size of these spheres.
We used a slightly simpliﬁed version of the design in Experiment 1, with only the in-sight visual condition, and (obviously) no
manipulation of color. Antecedent spheres were in position 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 or 13; for each antecedent sphere, the consequents were
+/−1 and +/−3 (with the exception of antecedent spheres 3 and 12, for which −3 and +3 were impossible, respectively).
Participants were presented with the full set of 22 items on the same page in an individually randomized order.
7.3. Results and discussion
7.3.1. Indeterminate responses
Overall, participants classiﬁed 58.2 percent of the conditionals as true, 27.4 percent as false, and 14.5 percent as neither true nor
false. Again, only one of the 39 participant always responded with “Neither true nor false” while the majority never used this
response (two participants always responded with “True” and zero always with “False”). Fig. 7.2 displays the distribution of the
individual response proportions. The pattern shown broadly replicates that of Experiment 1, supporting our if-heuristic override
hypothesis. The rate of indeterminate responses was slightly higher in this experiment, perhaps because a sizable minority (12
participants) never used “False” as response.
7.3.2. “True” versus “False” responses
Our main analysis again concerned the rate of “True” versus “False” responses, as HIT predicted a unique pattern. Mean response
proportions as a function of the independent variables are displayed in Fig. 7.3.
Eyeball inspection of the Figure reveals that the results conceptually replicate those of Experiment 1 (Fig. 6.3), although the
pattern diﬀers in some respects. On the one hand, consequent eﬀects seem considerably weaker here; on the other hand, direction
eﬀects seem at least equally strong or even stronger. Furthermore, there seems to be evidence for a distance × direction interaction:
the distance eﬀect seems strong in the incongruent direction, but absent in the congruent direction.
Model selection. In the ﬁrst step we compared again three GLMMs: a model for HIT (with ﬁxed eﬀects for direction, distance,
consequent, and all interactions), a consequent model (with consequent as its only ﬁxed eﬀect), and an antecedent–consequent model
(with antecedent, consequent, and their interaction as ﬁxed eﬀects). Results are displayed in Table 7.1. In line with the eyeball
inspection of Fig. 7.3, the HIT model clearly provides the best account, >ΔAIC 22.
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Analysis of HIT model. Next we tested for the speciﬁc predictions of HIT.10 In support of the inferential strength hypothesis, we
found a very strong main eﬀect of direction, = <χ p(1) 34.76, .00012 , >OR 5000, indicating that conditionals with consequent
spheres on the congruent side were unanimously judged to be true ( =EMM 1.00), while those on the incongruent side were only
judged as true in about a ﬁfth of the cases ( =EMM .22). The eﬀect of distance was also present, but less pronounced,
= =χ p(1) 6.15, .012 , =OR 7.35. Consequent spheres one step away ( =EMM .98) were more likely to be judged “True” than con-
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10 This analysis is based on the HIT model without correlation among random slopes as we were unable to reliably obtain p-values for the model including
correlations (see, e.g., Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015). See supplemental materials Table 3 for full results.
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sequent spheres three steps away ( =EMM .89). As in Experiment 1, we did not ﬁnd strong evidence for the direction × distance
interaction, = =χ p(1) 3.32, .072 (but see below).
We again found support for the predicted belief bias eﬀect, but as expected, it was not as strong as the eﬀect found in Experiment
1, = = =χ p b(1) 8.27, .004, 0.262 , 95% CI [0.10, 0.43]. Furthermore, we again found the analogue to the validity × believability in-
teraction, the direction × consequent interaction, = =χ p(1) 10.61, .0012 . The eﬀect of consequent (i.e., “believability”) was absent
for congruent (i.e., “valid”) spheres, =b 0.03, 95% CI −[ 0.18, 0.24], but clearly present for incongruent (i.e., “invalid”) spheres,
=b 0.49, 95% CI [0.25, 0.73].
In addition, we also found a three-way interaction of direction × distance × consequent, = =χ p(1) 10.90, .0012 . This interaction
is displayed in Fig. 7.4 and more clearly exhibits the pattern discussed above. The belief bias eﬀect of consequent seems to appear
only for “invalid and improbable” spheres, that is, those which are neither in the congruent direction nor only one step away.
Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of consequent is only signiﬁcantly above zero for incongruent spheres with distance 3, =b 0.84, 95% CI
[0.43, 1.25]. For congruent spheres with distance 3, the eﬀect of consequent is virtually zero, = −b 0.08, 95% CI −[ 0.38, 0.22]. For
spheres with distance 1, the estimated eﬀect of consequent is =b 0.14 for both congruency conditions, with 95% CI −[ 0.14, 0.42] for
Table 7.1
Model comparison of GLMMs on “True” versus “False” responses for Experiment 2.
Model Kf Kr LL AIC ΔAIC BIC ΔBIC
HIT 8 8/28 −178.46 444.93 0.00 647.26 115.07
Consequent 2 2/1 −380.99 771.99 327.06 794.98 262.79
Antecedent–consequent 4 4/6 −219.91 467.82 22.89 532.20 0.00
Note. See Table 6.2. The apparent better performance of the antecedent–consequent model compared to HIT in terms of BIC is a consequence of the correlation
parameters among random eﬀects and the large penalty provided by BIC for each parameter. After removing those correlations, HIT provides the best account in terms
of both AIC, >ΔAIC 150, and BIC, >ΔBIC 110. This suggests that, given the modest sample size, estimating correlations among random slopes is not completely
justiﬁable (see also Bates et al., 2015).
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congruent spheres and 95% CI −[ 0.06, 0.34] for incongruent spheres. The reason for the apparent diﬀerence between the two distance
1 conditions is a diﬀerent intercept (i.e., EMM). The EMMs for the four conditions are =EMM 1.00cong1 , =EMM 1.00cong3 ,
=EMM .58incong1 , and =EMM 0.05incong3 .
8. Experiment 3
According to our if-heuristic override hypothesis, the soritical truth-table task provides a strong cue to the guaranteed relevance
of the antecedent even when the antecedent is false. This leads to a prediction of an unusually low proportion of indeterminate
responses, compared to ﬁeld benchmarks. Experiments 1 and 2 provided strong evidence for this hypothesis, with a very low pro-
portion of indeterminate responses. However, Experiments 1 and 2 did not provide a control condition with no guaranteed relevance.
The aim of Experiment 3 was to test our predictions against a control condition with a comparable task which nevertheless does not
guarantee the relevance of the antecedent, providing a more robust test of the if-heuristic override hypothesis. Thus, Experiment 3 is
a direct test of HIT’s principle of relevant inference.
To create a control condition, we presented participants with the same soritical truth-table task, but instead of a single soritical
series we combined the colored patches series used in Experiment 1 with the spheres series used in Experiment 2. (See Fig. 8.1.)
In the experimental conditions, participants were presented with conditionals whose antecedent and consequent were within a
single series; for the control conditions, participants were presented with conditionals whose antecedent and consequent were be-
tween series. Thus, we had two main test conditions articulated through four types of conditionals:
1. Within-series conditionals (experimental condition; guaranteed relevance):
(a) within-series colors–colors (e.g., “If patch A is blue, then patch D is blue”);
(b) within-series spheres–spheres (e.g., “If sphere 1 is large, then sphere 4 is large”).
2. Between-series conditionals (control condition; no guaranteed relevance):
(a) between-series colors–spheres (e.g., “If patch A is blue, then sphere 4 is large”);
(b) between-series spheres–colors (e.g., “If sphere 1 is large, then patch D is blue”).
In the between-series control condition, in which participants had to infer from an antecedent in one series to a consequent in
another series, relevance of the antecedent to the consequent was blocked. By contrast, the within-series experimental conditions
required participants to infer within the same soritical series, so that relevance was guaranteed. Moreover, to suppress relevance more
eﬀectively, the direction in each series was contralateral: for the colors series the congruent direction was right-to-left (i.e., color
terms always referred to “blue”), whereas for the spheres series the congruent direction was left-to-right (i.e., sphere terms always
referred to “large”). Hence, participants could not draw inference from one series to another merely by analogy to the number of
required steps in the other series. Thus, for the within-series condition we expected a replication of the pattern we identiﬁed in
Experiments 1 and 2, whereas for the between-series condition we expected participants to revert to the defective truth-table pattern
typically observed in the ﬁeld.
8.1. Predictions
Our main prediction concerned the if-heuristic override. The manipulation we introduced was designed so that the between-series
condition would suppress the strong relevance cue delivered by the use of the soritical series, while this cue would be largely
preserved in the within-series condition. Furthermore, in the between-series condition we blocked participants from any quick-and-
easy ways to infer from antecedent to consequent. Therefore, we expected participants to resort in that condition to the usual pattern
observed for abstract conditionals, namely the defective truth table (TF##), perhaps with a minority conforming to the conjunctive
pattern (TFFF) as found in previous studies (e.g., Evans et al., 2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). By contrast, we expected the
proportion of indeterminate responses in the within-series condition to remain comparable to that of the previous two experiments.
The main prediction for Experiment 3 was therefore that the proportion of indeterminate responses would be signiﬁcantly higher in
the between-series condition relative to the within-series condition.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Fig. 8.1. Task structure for Experiment 3. Participants were shown the above while being given conditionals of two main types: conditionals with both antecedent and
consequent within a single series (e.g., “If patch A is blue, then patch D is blue”; “If sphere 1 is large, then sphere 4 is large”); and conditionals in which the antecedent
and the consequent were between the series (e.g., “If patch A is blue, then sphere 4 is large”; “If sphere 1 is large, then patch D is blue”). Relevance is guaranteed for
within-series but not for between-series conditionals.
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The defective truth table means that the rate of indeterminate responses in the between-series condition should be a function of
the truth of the antecedent: where the antecedent is false or indeterminate, the conditional should be evaluated as indeterminate
(e.g., Evans et al., 2003; Baratgin et al., 2013). As an illustration, see Fig. 6.1. As the antecedent progresses from left to right, patches
are predominantly evaluated ﬁrst as blue (= “True”), then as neither blue nor green (= “Indeterminate”), and ﬁnally as green (=
“False”). Thus, we predicted that the proportion of indeterminate responses in the between-series conditions would increase as a
function of antecedent rank when moving toward the “False” end of the scale—that is, toward the green end of the scale in the
colors–spheres condition, and toward the smaller end of the scale in the spheres–colors condition.
We also had auxiliary predictions for the pattern of determinate responses. Broadly, we expected a replication of the pattern in
Experiments 1 and 2 for the within-series condition: main eﬀects of distance, direction, and consequent. However, even for the
within-series condition, the situation is somewhat more complex relative to Experiments 1 and 2, because the second series is always
in sight and might provide misleading cues. For the between-series condition, participants were likely to create ad hoc heuristics to
reduce the cognitive load, but we had no way to know in advance what these heuristics might be. We therefore left predictions for the
determinate responses in this experiment exploratory.
8.2. Method
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred and seventy-three participants were recruited the same way as in the previous experiments. We used the same
validation measures and exclusion criteria as in Experiment 2, which left us with 116 participants. These participants spent on
average 481 s on the experiment (SD: 158 s). Ninety of them had a university education and 26 had only a high school or secondary
school education. Their mean age was 39 years (±11).
DESIGN AND MATERIALS
The experiment was a combination of Experiments 1 (“in-sight” condition) and 2. In each trial, participants always saw both the
soritical color patches series on top and the soritical series of spheres right underneath it, as shown in Fig. 8.1. The soritical series of
color patches was labeled from A to N instead of from 1 to 14 (as it was in Experiment 1), so that all patches and spheres would have
diﬀerent labels. Color terms always referred to “blue” and sphere terms always referred to “large”.
Each participant was presented with a total of 24 conditionals in two main relevance conditions: 12 conditionals in the within-series
condition (guaranteed relevance), in which the conditional referred to only one of the two soritical series; and 12 conditionals in the
between-series condition (no guaranteed relevance control condition), in which the conditional referred to one of the soritical series in
the antecedent and to the other one in the consequent. For the 12 conditionals in each condition the consequent patches/spheres were
in position 4, 8, and 11 (or D, H, and K); for each consequent patch sphere, the antecedents were +/−1 and +/−3. This resulted in a
balanced design for the HIT relevant factors distance and direction.
Between-participants we manipulated the type of soritical series in the within-series (1a or 1b) and between-series (2a or 2b)
conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups:
♢ Within-series conditionals: colors (condition 1a); between-series conditionals: colors–spheres (condition 2a); =N 24.
♢ Within-series conditionals: colors (condition 1a); between-series conditionals: spheres–colors (condition 2b); =N 37.
♢ Within-series conditionals: spheres (condition 1b); between-series conditionals: colors–spheres (condition 2a); =N 25.
♢ Within-series conditionals: spheres (condition 1b); between-series conditionals: spheres–colors (condition 2b); =N 30.
The levels of the direction variable for the within-series conditions were deﬁned as in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.
Speciﬁcally, in condition 1a (colors–colors) consequent patches on the left (i.e., bluer) side of the antecedent were considered
congruent (and incongruent otherwise) and in condition 1b (spheres–spheres) consequent patches on the right (i.e., larger) side of the
antecedent were considered congruent (and incongruent otherwise). Thus, for example, the item “If patch E is blue, so is patch D” is
congruent; similarly, the item “If sphere 5 is large, so is sphere 6” is also congruent.
Note that the congruent direction for the color patches series is from right to left, whereas the congruent direction for the spheres
series is from left to right. As previously mentioned, this was a deliberate choice whose aim was to suppress relevance by severing
connections between the series. Since congruency is deﬁned by the relation between antecedent and consequent, and since this
connection is deliberately disrupted in the between-series condition, this means that deﬁning direction in the between-series con-
ditions is less straightforward than in the within-series conditions. It is only possible to deﬁne direction analogously, either based on
the antecedent patch or based on the consequent patch. For example, in the conditional “If patch E is blue, then sphere 6 is large”, the
congruent direction based on the consequent is left-to-right, whereas based on the antecedent it would be right-to-left. While either
direction is equally philosophically plausible, psychological plausibility in this case calls for deﬁning between-series conditionals
based on the consequent. Recall that Experiments 1 and 2 found strong evidence for a belief bias analogue, that is, for a main eﬀect of
the consequent rank. Thus, in the soritical paradigm the consequent provides a strong heuristic cue to the truth value of the con-
ditional. For the between-series conditions, then, we deﬁned congruency analogously, based on the position of the consequent patch,
so that congruency in each between-series condition was deﬁned according to the analogous within-series condition with the same
consequent. Thus, congruency in condition 2a (colors–spheres) was deﬁned as it was in condition 1b (spheres–spheres), and con-
gruency in condition 2b (spheres–colors) was deﬁned as it was in condition 1a (colors–colors). For example, for the conditional “If
patch E is blue, then sphere 6 is large”, the congruent direction is left-to-right.
The order of the conditionals was individually randomized, with one conditional presented per page.
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8.3. Results and discussion
8.3.1. Indeterminate responses
To test our if-heuristic override hypothesis, we ﬁrst compared the rate of determinate versus indeterminate responses in the
within-series versus between-series test condition. Fig. 8.2 displays the full distribution of the individual response proportions se-
parated for within-series condition (upper row) and between-series condition (lower row). As expected, the rate of indeterminate
responses in the between-series condition outnumbered the rate of indeterminate responses in the within-series condition almost 3 :1.
The results for the within-series condition replicated those of Experiments 1 and 2. The observed rate of indeterminate responses was
13 percent (52 percent “True” and 35 percent “False”) and on the individual level 53 percent of participants never chose the
indeterminate response (3 percent never chose “True” and 10 percent never chose “False”). For the between-series condition, the
pattern was markedly diﬀerent and, as expected, the proportion of indeterminate response replicated the typical defective truth table
pattern (e.g., Schroyens, 2010): 38 percent “Neither true nor false” responses, 44 percent “False” responses, and 18 percent “True”
responses. On the individual level, only 30 percent never chose the “Neither true nor false” response whereas 41 percent never chose
“True” and 17 percent never chose “False”. In addition, for the between-series condition 15 percent of participants always responded
with the indeterminate response (7 percent always with “False” and 0 percent always with “True”), whereas this rate was only 2
percent for the within-series condition (0 percent always with “False” and 0 percent always with “True”).
To investigate this pattern further, we estimated a GLMM with the rate of indeterminate responses versus other responses as
dependent variable.11 The independent variables (i.e., ﬁxed eﬀects) were antecedent, a numerical variable from 1 to 14, centered at
the midpoint for the analysis; type, a mixed within–between factor with four levels derived from the group factor and the relevance
factor: (a) within-series colors, (b) within-series spheres, (c) between-series colors–spheres, and (d) between-series spheres–colors;
direction; distance; and their interactions. Recall that the defective truth table pattern means that the rate of indeterminate responses
in the between-series condition should be a function of the truth of the antecedent. Thus, we predicted that the slope in the between-
series condition should signiﬁcantly diﬀer from 0, and that the slope in the between-series conditions should be signiﬁcantly steeper
than the slope in the within-series conditions.
The GLMM revealed the expected main eﬀect of type, = <χ p(3) 54.09, .00012 . Inspection of all pairwise comparisons of the four
means conﬁrmed the predictions: the rate of indeterminate responses was larger for the between-series conditionals ( =EMM .24)
than for the within-series conditionals ( =EMM .01). Neither levels (a) and (b) nor levels (c) and (d) diﬀered from each other, both
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11 All tests for ﬁxed eﬀects for Experiment 3 are based on a model without correlations among random parameters, due to numerical problems in obtaining p-values
in the model with correlations.
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>ps .98, whereas all other pairwise comparisons were signiﬁcant, all <ps .0001. We also found a main eﬀect of direction,
= =χ p(1) 13.38, .00032 , which indicated that, overall, participants gave more indeterminate responses to incongruent items
( =EMM .09) than to congruent items ( =EMM .04). This main eﬀect was qualiﬁed by a type × direction interaction,
= <χ p(3) 32.16, .00012 , and a type × direction × distance interaction, = =χ p(3) 8.80, .032 . Follow-up analysis on the latter in-
teraction revealed that the eﬀect of direction was only signiﬁcant for far patches in condition (a) ( =EMM .01cong versus
= = − =z pEMM .05, 3.11, .02incong ) and near patches in condition (b) ( =EMM .00cong versus = = − <z pEMM .05, 5.22, .0001incong ).
The eﬀect of direction did not reach signiﬁcance in the between-series conditions (c) ( =EMM .29cong versus
= = =z pEMM .20, 1.33, .56incong ) or (d) ( =EMM .30cong versus = = =z pEMM .19, 1.69, .32incong ).
More importantly, the GLMM also provided evidence for the expected type × antecedent interaction, = =χ p(1) 12.01, .0072 ,
displayed in Fig. 8.3. The visual impression from the ﬁgure is very much in line with a defective truth table pattern for the between-
series condition. When moving to the “False” end of the scale—that is, to the right if the antecedent is a color as in condition (c), and
to the left if the antecedent is a sphere as in condition (d)—the probability of an indeterminate response visibly increases. The
antecedent slope diﬀered signiﬁcantly from 0 in condition (d), = −b 0.11, 95% CI − −[ 0.21, 0.02], although not in condition (c),
=b 0.04, 95% CI −[ 0.06, 0.14]. In the within-series condition the slope in condition (a) also diﬀered signiﬁcantly from 0, =b 0.15,
95% CI [0.03, 0.28] (i.e., also tended to show the defective truth table pattern, albeit less pronounced, as Fig. 8.3 shows), but not in
condition (b), = −b 0.01, 95% CI −[ 0.14, 0.11]. In terms of diﬀerences between slopes, the slope in condition (d) was signiﬁcantly
steeper than the slope in condition (a), = =z p3.32, .005. However, none of the remaining comparisons between slopes reached
signiﬁcance, < >z p| | 2.2, .13. Thus, responses in the between-series conditions tended to conform to the defective truth table pattern
more than the responses in the within-series conditions (although not all relevant comparisons were signiﬁcant). None of the other
eﬀects of the GLMM reached signiﬁcance, largest =χ (3) 7.762 , smallest =p .05.
Taken together, these results show two things: (1) Guaranteed relevance provides an important cue for participants to override
the if-heuristic which leads to an overall very low level of indeterminate responses. (2) In the absence of guaranteed relevance, the if-
heuristic produces a defective truth table pattern, where the rate of indeterminate responses appears to be a function of antecedent
position. In addition, the descriptive analysis slightly qualiﬁed the support for our hypothesis. When the strong relevance cue was
absent, there was a marked increase in the rate of indeterminate responses, but also in the rate of “False” responses. This suggests that
participants are somewhat split whether or not conditionals in the between-series condition were void or just false. This pattern is in
line with recent research on the defective truth table (e.g., Schroyens, 2010). Another possibility is that the increased proportion of
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“False” responses is due to some participants in the between-series condition resorting to conjunctive responses, a pattern often found
with abstract conditionals (e.g., Evans et al., 2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003).
8.3.2. “True” versus “False” responses
Mean response proportions of the “True” versus “False” judgments are displayed in Fig. 8.4. For the within-series conditions (top
panels), the pattern appears to replicate those of Experiments 1 and 2. For condition (a), the pattern seems to replicate the results
from Experiment 1 almost exactly with the exception of one data point: the middle point for incongruent patches with distance 3
seems too low. The pattern in condition (b) seems to match the results from Experiment 2 almost exactly.
For the between-series condition (lower panels), the pattern appears to be markedly diﬀerent than for the within-series condition,
with overall a considerably lower level of “True” judgments. Nevertheless, two main trends still appear to be present, to wit, larger
rates of true judgments for congruent compared to incongruent conditionals, and visible consequent slopes.12
Model selection. As in the analyses of the previous experiments, we compared three GLMMs: one for HIT (i.e., ﬁxed eﬀects for
direction, distance, consequent, type, and all interactions); a consequent model (i.e., consequent, type, and their interaction); and an
antecedent–consequent model (i.e., antecedent, consequent, type, and their interactions). Based on the expected diﬀerences between
the within-series and between-series condition, we performed this analysis separately for each condition. This decision made type a
between-subjects factor with two levels in each condition. Results are displayed in Table 8.1 and show the expected diﬀerence
between the two conditions. For the within-series condition, the HIT model provided, as expected, the best account, >ΔAIC 150. For
the between-series condition, the antecedent–consequent model provided the best account, >ΔAIC 78.
Analysis of HIT model: Within-series condition. For the within-series conditions, our main prediction was a replication of the pattern
found in the previous experiment. In line with this, we found support for the inferential strength hypothesis with both a main eﬀect of
direction, = <χ p(1) 25.49, .00012 , >OR 2100 ( =EMM 1.00cong versus =EMM .61incong ), and a main eﬀect of distance
= <χ p(1) 42.95, .00012 , >OR 24000, ( =EMM 1.001 versus =EMM .323 ). Again we did not ﬁnd a direction × distance interaction,
= =χ p(1) 0.00, .952 , but a type × direction interaction, = <χ p(1) 58.43, .00012 , and a type × direction × distance interaction,
= =χ p(1) 12.22, .00052 . The last two eﬀects indicate that the eﬀect of direction and distance diﬀered between the spheres–spheres
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12 Note again that congruency in the between-series condition is based on the position of the consequent.
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and colors–colors conditions (see supplemental materials for details).
We also again found support for the belief bias eﬀect, a signiﬁcant type × consequent interaction, = <χ p(1) 102.11, .00012
( = −b 5.99color , 95% CI − −[ 7.23, 4.75], versus =b 1.86spheres , 95% CI [0.96, 2.76]). There was also evidence for the validity × belief
analogue, a signiﬁcant type × direction × consequent interaction, = =χ p(1) 11.51, .00072 . In the colors–colors condition, the eﬀect
of consequent was less pronounced for congruent ( = −b 5.26, 95% CI − −[ 6.54, 3.98]) than for incongruent patches ( = −b 6.72, 95% CI
− −[ 8.22, 5.22]), in the spheres–spheres condition the eﬀect of consequent was absent for congruent patches ( =b 0.55, 95% CI
−[ 0.29, 1.40]) but it was clearly there for incongruent patches ( =b 3.17, 95% CI [1.83, 4.51]), and all slopes diﬀered from each other
( <p .03). We also found a main eﬀect of type, = =χ p(1) 14.28, .00022 , =OR 650, indicating that the rate of true judgments was
larger in the colors–colors condition ( =EMM 1.00) than in the spheres–spheres condition ( =EMM .74). None of the remaining
interactions reached signiﬁcance, largest =χ (1) 1.12 , smallest =p .29.
Analysis of HIT model: Between-series condition. For the between-series conditions, the results were in line with the visual in-
spection. We observed an eﬀect of direction, = =χ p(1) 4.79, .032 , =OR 12.36, ( =EMM .28cong versus =EMM .03incong ) and a type ×
consequent interaction, = <χ p(1) 20.41, .00012 ( =b 0.44colors—spheres , 95% CI [0.10, 0.78], versus = −b 0.56spheres—colors , 95% CI
− −[ 0.85, 0.28]). In addition, we found a main eﬀect of type, = =χ p(1) 8.77, .0032 , =OR 0.13, indicating that the rate of true
judgments was larger in the spheres–colors condition ( =EMM .23) than in the colors–spheres condition ( =EMM .04). None of the
remaining eﬀects reached signiﬁcance, largest =χ (1) 3.22 , smallest =p .07.
In conclusion, in Experiment 3 we set out to test the principle of relevant inference, by pitting conditionals which refer to a single
soritical series, whose relevance is guaranteed, against conditionals which refer to two soritical series, where relevance is suppressed.
We predicted, and found, that when relevance was suppressed, the proportion of indeterminate responses was substantially and
signiﬁcantly higher, increasing as the antecedent rank became “falser,” conforming to the defective conditional pattern. In contrast,
when the antecedent and consequent were within a single series, we replicated the patterns found in Experiments 1 and 2.
9. Experiment 4
All previous experiments supported our principle of relevant inference, demonstrating that, under conditions of guaranteed re-
levance, the defective truth table pattern disappears. Moreover, Experiment 3 directly supported this principle by demonstrating that
when this relevance was defeated, responses relapsed to the defective truth table. Thus far, we supported our principle of bounded
inference by showing that factors hypothesized to aﬀect the strength of inference from antecedent to consequent also aﬀected truth
evaluation, and that the evaluation pattern was subject to the same belief bias that aﬀects other types of inference. Experiment 4
aimed to provide a more direct support for the principle of bounded inference, by using a measure of participants’ subjective
evaluations of bounded inference strength. Moreover, Experiment 4 is the most direct test of the core principle of HIT, the in-
ferentialist principle that truth evaluations of conditionals are determined by the existence of an inferential connection between
antecedent and consequent.
In this experiment, we returned to the stimuli set used in Experiment 1 (where belief bias was more in evidence), but added two
direct measures: we asked participants to evaluate the strength of the inference from antecedent to consequent, as well as their
metacognitive conﬁdence in their response. The inference strength scale was borrowed from Elqayam et al. (2015), and is suitable for
directly measuring the strength of informal inference. Participants are presented with the premise (in this case, the antecedent) and
the conclusion (in this case, the consequent), and asked to rate the extent to which the conclusion follows from the premise on a scale
from “Deﬁnitely does not follow” to “Deﬁnitely follows.”
The metacognitive conﬁdence scale was inspired by recent work on metacognition and reasoning, sometimes dubbed “meta-
reasoning” (see, e.g., Ackerman & Thompson, 2015, 2017a, 2017b; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). This research
domain, which branches oﬀ dual process theories, explores the psychological on/oﬀ switch for eﬀortful, Type 2 processing. We will
have more to say about metacognition and meta-reasoning in the General Discussion; for now we just note that meta-reasoning
research inspired our work in two ways. First, it makes a ﬁrm distinction between direct judgments of inference such as validity or
Table 8.1
Model comparison of GLMMs on “True” versus “False” responses for Experiment 3.
Model Kf Kr LL AIC ΔAIC BIC ΔBIC
Within-series condition
HIT 16 8/28 −403.20 910.41 0.00 1175.09 22.14
Consequent 4 2/1 −677.46 1368.91 458.50 1404.54 251.59
Antecedent–consequent 8 4/6 −512.66 1061.33 150.92 1152.95 0.00
Between-series condition
HIT 16 8/28 −341.51 787.01 78.69 1034.43 240.47
Consequent 4 2/1 −404.85 823.70 115.38 857.00 63.04
Antecedent–consequent 8 4/6 −336.16 708.32 0.00 793.97 0.00
Note. See Table 6.2. As in Experiment 2, the apparent better performance of the antecedent–consequent model compared to the HIT model for the within-series
condition in terms of BIC is a consequence of the correlation parameters among the random eﬀects. When removing those, the HIT model provides the best account in
terms of both AIC, >ΔAIC 150, and BIC, >ΔBIC 95. For the between-series condition, removing the correlations does not aﬀect the ordering of the models in terms of
their AIC or BIC performance.
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strength (ﬁrst-order measures), and conﬁdence in those judgments (a second-order measure). Second, it provided the scale for
metacognitive conﬁdence, which we needed in order to estimate when the inference is considered to be satisﬁcing, or strong enough.
Recall that, according to HIT’s principle of bounded inference, the inference from antecedent to consequent should be strong enough
for a conditional to be evaluated as true. Consequently, we needed to ask for both inference strength judgments and metacognitive
conﬁdence, in order to capture the “strong” element as well as the “enough” element of this principle, respectively.
9.1. Predictions
We had four sets of predictions: ﬁrst, we predicted replication of the pattern established in the three previous experiments, and
especially Experiment 1. We also had three graded sets of predictions for the added variables that measure bounded inference, that is,
inference strength and metacognitive conﬁdence.
Replication. For the truth evaluation task, our predictions were essentially the same as in Experiment 1. We predicted a replication
of the inferential strength eﬀect, articulated as main eﬀects of direction and distance. We left the distance × direction interaction
again as an exploratory hypothesis. We also predicted a consequent eﬀect (our belief bias analogue). As a minor prediction, we
predicted a consequent × direction eﬀect, a replication of the same eﬀect from Experiments 1 and 2. As before, this prediction is less
ﬁrm because the believability × validity interaction is not universal in belief bias.
Bounded inference. HIT’s central thesis is that the mechanism that underlies the truth evaluation of conditionals is, by default,
relevant, bounded inference from antecedent to consequent. In this experiment, bounded inference was measured by the twin
parameters of inference strength judgment and metacognitive conﬁdence. There are three graded interpretations of this thesis. If HIT
is right, then truth evaluation should mimic the same response pattern as the variable measuring bounded inference, that is, inference
strength and metacognitive conﬁdence, providing a basic level of support for the thesis. Hence, we expected that inference strength
judgment and metacognitive conﬁdence would reﬂect the same pattern as truth evaluation. Speciﬁcally, we predicted inference
strength judgment to be sensitive to distance and direction (the factors manipulating inferential strength) in the same way as truth
evaluation; and we expected both inference strength judgment and metacognitive conﬁdence to be sensitive to consequent eﬀects,
again in the same way as truth evaluation. We left any interaction eﬀects between direction and distance as an exploratory hy-
pothesis. As a minor prediction, we predicted a consequent × direction eﬀect on inference strength judgment.13
To provide stronger support for HIT, our bounded inference variables (i.e., inference strength judgment and metacognitive conﬁdence)
should also predict truth evaluation, in a model in which truth evaluation is the criterion and all other variables—distance, direction,
consequent, inference strength judgment, and metacognitive conﬁdence—are predictors. The bounded inference variables should be sig-
niﬁcant predictors of truth evaluation, thus providing an intermediate level of support for HIT. At the strongest level of support, inference
strength judgment and metacognitive conﬁdence should be the only signiﬁcant predictors in such a model, superseding all other predictors
such as direction and distance, hence showing that bounded inference is the only explanation for truth evaluation.
9.2. Method
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred and thirty-three participants were recruited the same way as in the previous experiments. We used the same
validation measures and exclusion criteria as in Experiment 2, which left us with 99 participants.14 These participants spent on
average 502 s on the experiment (SD: 186 s). Seventy-ﬁve of them had a university education and 24 had only a high school or
secondary school education. Their mean age was 41 years (±11).
DESIGN AND MATERIALS
We used a trimmed-down version of the design from Experiment 1, with only the in-sight visual condition, a single named color
condition (blue), and with two levels of distance, 1 and 3, manipulated entirely within participants. Each participant was presented
with a total of 14 conditionals. Antecedent patches were in position 3, 6, 9, or 12, and for each antecedent patch, the consequents
were+/−1 and+/−3 (with the exception of antecedent patches 3 and 12, for which−3 and, respectively,+3 were impossible).
Participants were asked to complete two tasks, presented in counterbalanced order, so that half of the participants completed the
truth-evaluation task ﬁrst (50 of the ﬁnal participants), and half of the participants completed the bounded inference task ﬁrst (49 of
the ﬁnal participants). The truth-evaluation task was identical to the one in Experiment 1, with the same soritical color series.
Participants were ﬁrst given a practice item, then presented with the set of 14 items, each on a separate page, in an individually
randomized order.
The bounded inference task, presented separately, included two questions for each item: inference strength judgment and me-
tacognitive conﬁdence. The inference strength task presented participants with the antecedent of the conditional as a premise, and
asked them to evaluate how strongly the consequent followed on a fully-labeled 7-point Likert-type scale: Deﬁnitely does not follow,
Follows very weakly, Follows weakly, Follows to some degree, Follows strongly, Follows very strongly, and Deﬁnitely follows. This question
13 We expected metacognitive conﬁdence only to be aﬀected by intuitive factors (in our task, consequent eﬀects), since it is well-established in the metacognition
literature that time-free conﬁdence ratings (“Final Judgment of Conﬁdence”) are only sensitive to those factors (e.g., Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Thompson et al.,
2011, 2013).
14 In relation to Experiment 2, the =N 99 is consistent with the 2.5 times rule of Simonsohn (2015) for replication studies.
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was followed by the metacognitive question directly underneath, taken from Thompson et al. (2011): “In providing my answer to the
above question I felt: ...,” which in turn was followed by a partially-labeled 7-point Likert-type scale with the labels Guessing, Fairly
certain, and Certain I’m right in the extreme left, midpoint, and extreme right, respectively.15 Following a separate practice item, the
14 test items were presented, each on a separate page, in an individually randomized order; see Fig. 9.1 for an example.
9.3. Results and discussion
A ﬁrst analysis showed that the order in which participants worked on the two tasks did not aﬀect the results (i.e., when including
order in the models reported below, no eﬀect involving order reached signiﬁcance). Furthermore, for some GLMMs excluding order
led to a better model ﬁt than including order, indicating that models including order did not converge to the maximum likelihood
estimates (for LMMs—see below—the diﬀerence in model ﬁt was very small and not signiﬁcant). Consequently, all results reported
below are based on models without order as factor.
9.3.1. Indeterminate responses
Overall, participants classiﬁed 59.5 percent of the conditionals as true, 26.8 percent as false, and 13.6 percent as neither true nor
false. In line with the previous results, only one of the 99 participant always responded with “Neither true nor false” while 38
participants never used this response (zero participants always responded with “True” and two never, and one participant always
responded with “False” and eleven never). Fig. 9.2 displays the distribution of the individual response proportions; these are very
similar to the results from Experiments 1 and 2 as well as from the inferential connection condition of Experiment 3.
9.3.2. “True” versus “False” responses
Fig. 9.3 displays the rate of “True” versus “False” responses. The pattern of results clearly resembles the pattern of results from
Experiment 1, showing a strong consequent eﬀect as well as an eﬀect of distance. Only the eﬀect of direction seems absent or at least
strongly attenuated. We start this section with comparing the HIT model with competitor models before testing the presence of the
predicted eﬀects.
Model selection. Table 9.1 shows the GLMM model selection result for the three models corresponding to the main accounts. As
before, the HIT model provides the best account, >ΔAIC 134. This strongly indicates, once again, that only when considering all
variables deemed relevant by HIT can a model provide an adequate account of “True” versus “False” judgments.
Analysis of HIT model. Regarding the eﬀect of the inferential strength parameters—distance and direction—we did not see an
eﬀect of direction, = =χ p(1) 2.30, .132 .16 But we found a main eﬀect of distance again, = <χ p(1) 60.51, .00012 . Patches with
distance 1 were more likely to be judged true ( =EMM 1.001 ) than patches with distance 3 ( =EMM .493 ), >OR 590000. In addition,
we now found a direction × distance interaction, = =χ p(1) 9.73, .0022 . However, this interaction only partly supported the pre-
dictions. There was no support for the predicted diﬀerential eﬀect of distance within each level of direction. Instead, there was a
strong eﬀect of direction for patches with distance 1, = =z p2.14, .03, >OR 1000 (although = =EMM EMM 1.00cong incong ), but no
Fig. 9.1. Inference strength judgment and metacognitive conﬁdence task example.
15 Note that this is not the full Thompson two-response paradigm, in which participants ﬁrst provide a quick response, which is then followed by a second response
with more time for eﬀortful processing; we only adopted the conﬁdence question as a measure of satisﬁcing. We will return to this issue in the General Discussion.
16 Just as for Experiment 2, we were unable to reliably obtain p-values for the model including correlations among random slopes. Consequently, this section is
based on a model without correlations among random slopes. See Table 4 in the supplemental materials for full results.
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eﬀect of direction for patches with distance 3, = =z p0.08, .94, =OR 1.20 ( =EMM .51cong and =EMM .47incong ).
In support of our belief bias hypothesis, we found a strong main eﬀect of consequent, = < = −χ p b(1) 112.17, .0001, 5.612 , 95% CI
− −[ 7.14, 4.08], replicating the pattern observed in Experiments 1 and 2 and in the within-series condition of Experiment 3. We also
found a consequent × distance interaction, = =χ p(1) 7.20, .0072 (supplemental materials Fig. 10). Consequent eﬀects were strongest
(i.e., largest absolute value) for patches with distance 3, = −b 6.61, 95% CI − −[ 8.51, 4.71], and less strong (i.e., smaller absolute value)
for patches with distance 1, = −b 4.61, 95% CI − −[ 6.05, 3.18].
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9.3.3. Inference strength measure
For the inference strength measure we predicted the same pattern of results as for the truth judgments. Fig. 9.4 depicts the data
and reveals a very similar pattern as the one seen in Fig. 9.3.17 One can clearly see an eﬀect of consequent which appears stronger for
patches with distance 3 than for patches with distance 1. In addition to this, judgments of inference strength appear to be stronger for
congruent patches (top row) than for incongruent patches (bottom row). Further inspection also suggests a similar nonlinear re-
lationship. In the GLMM, this nonlinearity in the eﬀect of consequent was captured by the logistic linking function, but this solution is
not possible for linear mixed models (LMMs; Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). We therefore tried to capture the nonlinearity with a
simple quadratic eﬀect of consequent in addition to the linear eﬀect of consequent. As the comparison of observed and predicted data
in Figs. 9.4 and 9.5 shows, this was suﬃcient to adequately capture the trends in the data.
We entered the individual responses to the inference strength question to an LMM with ﬁxed eﬀects for direction, distance,
consequent (linear and quadratic), as well as their interactions. The results showed that all eﬀects, with the exception of the three-
way interaction of direction, distance, and the quadratic component of consequent ( = =χ p(1) 0.99, .322 ), reached signiﬁcance,
Table 9.1
Model comparison of GLMMs on “True” versus “False” responses for Experiment 4.
Model Kf Kr LL AIC ΔAIC BIC ΔBIC
HIT 8 8/28 −311.59 711.17 0.00 934.99 18.53
Consequent 2 2/1 −492.28 994.56 283.38 1019.99 103.53
Antecedent–consequent 4 4/6 −408.62 845.24 134.07 916.46 0.00
Note. See Table 6.2. As for Experiment 2, the apparent better performance of the antecedent–consequent model in terms of BIC is solely an eﬀect of the correlation
among random slopes. After removing those, HIT provides the best account in terms of both AIC, >ΔAIC 162, and BIC, >ΔBIC 121.
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Fig. 9.4. Responses to the inference strength measure and corresponding LMM predictions as a function of variables relevant to HIT. Individual data points are plotted
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17 For this and the analysis of metacognitive judgments, we included all trials, even those for which participants decided that the conditional was neither true nor
false. We did not see any reason to exclude trials here. However, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer, excluding the indeterminate responses makes the analysis
more similar to the one reported for the “True” versus “False” judgments. Consequently, we repeated both analyses excluding the indeterminate responses. This led to
the same pattern of signiﬁcant and non-signiﬁcant results as reported here.
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smallest =χ (1) 5.082 , largest =p .02. See supplemental materials Table 5 for full results. The corresponding model predictions are
plotted in Fig. 9.4 as black lines on top of the data points.
We also replicated the truth judgment pattern for inference strength judgments, thus supporting our inferential strength hy-
pothesis: congruent patches received stronger inference strength ratings than incongruent patches, =EMM 4.73 versus =EMM 3.91,
and patches with distance 1 received stronger inference strength ratings than patches with distance 3, =EMM 4.83 versus
=EMM 3.82. Furthermore, we replicated the belief bias eﬀect and found a clear linear eﬀect of consequent, = −b 0.37, 95% CI
− −[ 0.43, 0.31]. In line with the visual impression, we found a quadratic eﬀect of consequent, =b 0.025, 95% CI [0.016, 0.034].
Finally, we replicated the analogue to the believability × validity interaction: the (linear) eﬀect of consequent was strongest for
incongruent patches with distance 3, = −b 0.58, 95% CI − −[ 0.68, 0.48], which diﬀered from all other eﬀects of consequent, smallest
=z 4.6, all <ps .0001. The next strongest eﬀect was for incongruent patches with distance 1, = −b 0.36, 95% CI − −[ 0.42, 0.30], which
diﬀered from the eﬀect for congruent patches with distance 3, = −b 0.24, 95% CI − − = − =z p[ 0.34, 0.13], 2.57, .03, but not from the
eﬀect for congruent patches with distance 1, = −b 0.31, 95% CI − − = =z p[ 0.37, 0.25], 1.93, .11. The two eﬀects for congruent patches
did not diﬀer from each other, = − =z p1.53, .13.
9.3.4. Metacognitive conﬁdence
For the metacognitive conﬁdence judgments we only predicted eﬀects of consequent. Fig. 9.5 depicts the data; an eyeball test
suggests somewhat weaker eﬀects compared to those seen in Figs. 9.3 and 9.4, although the eﬀect of consequent still seems strong. To
statistically assess this pattern, we followed the same approach as for the inference strength measure and estimated an LMM with the
metacognitive judgments as dependent variable and ﬁxed eﬀects for direction, distance, consequent (linear and quadratic), as well as
their interactions (see supplemental materials Table 6 for full results). This analysis again supported our bounded inference pre-
diction at the basic level, showing a parallel pattern to that of truth evaluation. It revealed the predicted belief bias eﬀect, a main
eﬀect of consequent (linear component), = −b 0.10, 95% CI − − = <χ p[ 0.13, 0.07], (1) 31.16, .00012 . In addition, we found a main
eﬀect of the quadratic component of consequent, =b 0.015, 95% CI = =χ p[0.005, 0.025], (1) 8.71, .0032 .
We also found evidence for an eﬀect of inferential strength on metacognitive judgments: a main eﬀect of direction,
= =χ p(1) 8.57, .0032 , indicating that congruent patches received stronger certainty ratings, =EMM 5.69, than incogruent patches,
=EMM 5.43, as well as a main eﬀect of distance, = <χ p(1) 21.96, .00012 , indicating that consequent patches with distance 1,
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=EMM 5.741 , received stronger certainty ratings than congruent patches with distance 3, =EMM 5.383 . Finally, we found a weak
interaction of direction with the quadratic component of consequent, = =χ p(1) 4.46, .032 , indicating that the quadratic eﬀect is
absent for congruent patches, =b 0.008, 95% CI −[ 0.003, 0.018], but stronger for incongruent ones, =b 0.023, 95% CI [0.013, 0.033]. As
in the truth judgments and inference strength measure, this latter interaction can be interpreted as a validity × believability analogue.
9.3.5. Combined model
Recall that in Section 9.1 we introduced three possible levels of support for our bounded inference hypothesis: basic, in which the
bounded inference variables, inference strength and metacognitive conﬁdence, mimic the pattern found for truth evaluations; in-
termediate, in which these bounded inference variables also signiﬁcantly predict the truth evaluation pattern; and the strongest level,
in which they do so exclusively. To test if the data supported our bounded inference prediction at the intermediate or even strongest
level, we tested if inference strength judgment and metacognitive conﬁdence predict truth judgments. Fig. 9.6 shows those re-
lationships. For both variables an increase is strongly associated with a higher probability of responding with “True.” To test if these
eﬀects can explain the eﬀects of the variables deemed relevant by HIT (in a statistical sense), we combined each of the two variables
separately with the HIT model for truth judgments (a joint model with both variables did not converge). In contrast to the other tests
reported in this article, we were unable to employ likelihood ratio tests and had to resort to Wald tests instead (Fox, 2008).
Inference strength. We estimated a GLMM with truth judgments as dependent variable and ﬁxed eﬀects for direction, distance,
consequent, and their interactions plus a ﬁxed eﬀect for inference strength (after centering at the midpoint of the scale). As expected,
we found a strong eﬀect of inference strength judgment, =b 9.87, 95% CI = =χ p[4.80, 14.95], (1) 14.54, .00012 , thus providing sup-
port for our bounded inference hypothesis at the intermediate level. Inference strength judgment could however not explain all
eﬀects in the data, failing to provide full support for our bounded inference hypothesis at the strongest level. However, the eﬀects
were much attenuated, giving partial support to this level of the hypothesis. We did ﬁnd an eﬀect of distance, = =χ p(1) 3.93, .052 ,
=EMM 1.001 versus =EMM 0.793 , >OR 1000, but the consequent eﬀect was weaker, = −b 4.28, 95% CI
− − = =χ p[ 7.84, 0.73], (1) 5.58, .022 . Moreover, none of the other eﬀects reached signiﬁcance, largest =χ (1) 1.352 , smallest =p .25
(see Table 7 in the supplementary materials for full results).
Metacognitive conﬁdence. We estimated another GLMM on the truth judgments, but this time we added a ﬁxed eﬀect for meta-
cognitive judgment (centered). This analysis showed the expected eﬀect of metacognitive judgments, =b 1.07, 95% CI
= =χ p[0.23, 1.91], (1) 6.25, .012 , again providing support for our bounded inference hypothesis at the intermediate level. However,
this eﬀect was unable to fully explain the other eﬀects. We still found eﬀects of consequent, = −b 4.42, 95% CI
− − = <χ p[ 6.32, 2.52], (1) 20.83, .00012 , distance = =χ p(1) 10.16, .0012 , =EMM 1.001 versus =EMM 0.573 , >OR 1000, and a di-
rection × distance interaction, = =χ p(1) 7.79, .0052 . In addition we now also found a three-way interaction of consequent × di-
rection × distance, = =χ p(1) 5.29, .022 (see Fig. 11 in the supplementary materials for a depiction of this interaction and Table 8 for
full results). Thus, our bounded inference hypothesis was only partly supported at the strongest level.
In sum, the pattern of truth evaluations in Experiment 4 broadly replicated the one found in Experiment 1, with a low prevalence
of indeterminate responses supporting our if-heuristic override hypothesis. Although there was no main eﬀect of direction, we did
ﬁnd the usual distance eﬀects, as well as a direction × distance interaction, with some support for the inferential strength hypothesis.
We also supported the belief bias hypothesis via an eﬀect of believability (consequent) as well as a validity × belief (direction ×
consequent) interaction. Furthermore, we tested a novel hypothesis unique to this experiment, the bounded inference hypothesis, and
fully supported it at the basic and the intermediate level, and partly at the strongest level. Judgments of inference strength and
metacognitive conﬁdence displayed the same pattern as truth evaluations; and combined models showed that each of these two
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additional measures were strong and signiﬁcant predictors of truth evaluation, and that some of the other predictors were attenuated
(although this worked better for inference strength judgment than for metacognitive conﬁdence).
10. General discussion
In this paper, we presented HIT, a new theory of conditionals drawing on philosophical and psychological insights. According to
this theory, people judge the truth value of a conditional by assessing the strength of the inferential connection between its ante-
cedent and consequent, where the inferential connection may consist of any combination of deductive, inductive, and abductive
steps. At the processing level, HIT postulates a dual processing framework, in which both intuitive, resource-frugal processes (Type 1)
and eﬀortful processes (Type 2) play a role. We proposed that people construct a relevant mental representation, which by default is
the one in which there is an inferential relation between antecedent and consequent (principle of relevant inference). This relation need
only be strong enough, in the sense of being subjectively supported (principle of bounded inference). People judge the conditional as
true when there is a strong enough inferential connection between antecedent and consequent; false when the connection is weak or
there is an argument from the antecedent to the negation of the consequent; and neither true nor false when there is no inferential
connection at all, that is, when relevance cues fail. Because false antecedent cases tend to fall in the third category, HIT is able to
reconcile our expectation of an inferential relation between antecedent and consequent with the accumulated psychological evidence
for the defective truth table.
To test HIT, we designed a novel experimental task, the soritical truth table task, presenting it to a total of 893 participants across
four experiments. The task was speciﬁcally designed to guarantee relevance of the consequent to the antecedent even when the
antecedent is false, thus overriding the if-heuristic (the attentional cue which focuses speakers’ attention on the antecedent being
true), and circumventing the defective truth table response pattern. We varied parameters pertaining to inference strength such as
distance between the stimuli and the direction of inference. Participants were given the usual three response options, “True,” “False,”
and “Neither true nor false.” Additionally, in Experiment 3 we directly manipulated relevance, using a variation of the task in which
participants needed to evaluate conditionals within- versus between-soritical series. Experiment 4 also measured inference strength
and metacognitive conﬁdence, designed to tap directly into the strength of the bounded inference from antecedent to consequent.
Table 10.1 sums up our main ﬁndings across the four experiments.
HIT predicts a unique response pattern, much of which was strongly supported by our data. First, since the soritical truth table
task guarantees relevance, we predicted a massive majority of determinate (“True,” “False”) responses. That was also what we found,
which supported our if-heuristic override hypothesis. Only a minority of the responses, and, even more importantly, a very small
percentage of the responses to conditionals with false antecedents, were indeterminate—this, in stark contrast to the usual ﬁndings in
classical truth table tasks, the defective truth table, in which indeterminate responses to false antecedent cases tend to be prevalent.
We also found that when the task we designed undermined relevance (in Experiment 3), participants reverted to the defective truth
table pattern. Furthermore, our results supported the inferential strength hypothesis, with eﬀects of distance and direction in all four
experiments.
Perhaps our most striking ﬁnding is the belief bias analogue which we predicted and which the data strongly supported. If
conditionals are indeed inferential, they should display the same pattern found to hold for almost any type of inference, be it
deductive or non-deductive; that is, they should display belief bias, the tendency to judge an inference based on the believability of
the conclusion. Accordingly, we predicted a main eﬀect of the believability of the consequent, analogous to the main eﬀect of
conclusion believability in classic belief bias. This eﬀect replicated strongly and consistently across all four experiments. We also
Table 10.1
Summary of main results from Experiments 1–4.
Hypothesis Eﬀects HIT prediction Experiment
1 2 3R 4A 4B 4C
If-heuristic Indeterminate Small proportion of NA NA
override responses indeterminate responses
Inference strength Direction Congruent> incongruent
Distance Near> far
Belief bias Consequent True> False b
(belief bias 1)
Consequent × Stronger eﬀect of conse- c d e f g h
validity quent when direction
(belief bias 2) and distance provide no
reliable cues
Notes. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 measured truth evaluation. Predictions for Experiment 3 are only for the within-series condition where relevance is guaranteed
(indicated here as 3R). Experiment 4 measured truth evaluation (4A), judgment of inference strength (4B), and metacognitive conﬁdence (4C). Green checkmarks
indicate support from the data, the red cross indicates lack of support; a: eﬀect of direction for distance 1, but no eﬀect of direction for distance 3; b: linear and
quadratic; c: consequent × direction × color; d: consequent × direction; consequent × direction × distance; e: type× direction × consequent; f: consequent × distance; g:
consequent × direction × distance; h: consequent × direction (quadratic).
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predicted, and observed, an interaction eﬀect between consequent position and factors relating to inferential strength, viz., distance,
direction, or both. This eﬀect is analogous to the validity × believability interaction in syllogistic belief bias. These results provided
conceptual replication across the four experiments, although with some variations, a variability consistent with the extant literature
on belief bias, in which the believability × validity eﬀect of belief bias is not quite as robust as the main eﬀect of believability.
Lastly and importantly, in Experiment 4 we directly tested the inferentialist core idea of HIT, according to which inferential
connections determine truth evaluations of conditionals. We also tested the idea of bounded inference—that these connections need
only be strong enough in the sense of being subjectively supported. We postulated three levels of support for the principle of bounded
inference (the results for the relevant variables are depicted in Table 10.1): basic, in which the pattern for the bounded inference
variables mimics that of truth evaluation; intermediate, in which bounded inference variables predict truth evaluation; and strongest,
in which they do so exclusively. We found full support for the basic and intermediate levels, and partial support for the strongest
level: the eﬀects of other predictors attenuated when inference strength, but not when metacognitive conﬁdence, was in the model.
This may be due to the fact that we were unable to test both inference strength and metacognitive conﬁdence in the same model.
Another possible explanation is that we have not used the full meta-reasoning paradigm developed by Thompson and colleagues (e.g.,
Ackerman & Thompson, 2015, 2017a, 2017b; Thompson et al., 2011). Perhaps a combination of metacognitive measures would hit
closer to the mark. We leave such exploration to future work.
In conclusion, our ﬁndings provide extensive, robust, and consistent support for HIT. The strength of inference from antecedent to
consequent clearly has a major role to play in how we evaluate the truth of conditionals. We do not claim that this is all there is to
evaluating conditionals: recall that some of the eﬀects in Experiment 2 were attenuated, and that some predictors in Experiment 4
still played a role even when inference strength judgment or metacognitive conﬁdence were in the model. We cannot entirely rule out
factors beside inferential connections, but what we can say with conﬁdence is that such factors cannot explain away our ﬁndings in
any signiﬁcant way. In particular, the pervasive and strong belief bias analogue, which can only be predicted and explained by a
theory which regards conditionals as subject to inferential connections, provides strong psychological validation of our theory.
10.1. HIT, the Equation, and the New Paradigm
We are by no means the ﬁrst to suggest that natural language conditionals embody a relationship between antecedent and
consequent. We have already reviewed HIT’s predecessor in the philosophical literature, inferentialism as formalized by
Krzyżanowska et al. (2014). Within psychology, related ideas include Cheng and Holyoak’s (1985) pragmatic reasoning schemas, one
of which features causal-temporal relations between antecedent and consequent. Some of the work in mental model theory on spatial
and temporal relations within conditionals touches on the idea that the antecedent should be related to the consequent (e.g., Juhos,
Quelhas, & Johnson-Laird, 2012). Moreover, the idea takes center stage in theories of causal conditionals, especially those that
employ causal Bayes nets (Hall, Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2016; Oaksford & Chater, 2013, 2014). Ali, Chater, and Oaksford (2011)
refer approvingly to the position of Barwise and Perry (1983) that causal relations are at the semantic core of the conditional, and
their results give some support to this view (see also Fernbach & Erb, 2013). Such theories strongly endorse the idea of inferential
connections between antecedent and consequent, especially in the context of causal relations. How exactly inference of causal
connections between antecedent and consequent ﬁts into the larger picture of inferential connection is another important question
still awaiting future work. Our soritical truth table task draws on abstract materials, in which the inferential connection is non-causal;
it would be interesting to compare this to performance on an analogous causal task.
One possible interpretation is that causal Bayes nets can explain distance eﬀects as a transitive chain from patch to adjacent patch,
in which participants ﬁrst infer from, say, patch number 1 to patch number 2, and then from patch number 2 to patch number 3.18
Such chains may be driven by causality, but they may also be driven by inference. This (non-causal) interpretation of causal Bayes
nets makes it even closer to HIT; indeed, HIT might be considered as much a speciﬁc articulation of causal Bayes nets as it is of the
suppositional conditional.
Causal Bayes nets also make a good starting point for discussing the role of HIT within the broader framework of the New
Paradigm in psychology of reasoning. We see HIT as falling squarely within the New Paradigm, as HIT has a natural aﬃnity to
theories of conditionals within this family, such as the psychological suppositional conditional and causal Bayes nets analyses of
conditionals. The informal type of inference postulated by HIT, in which inferential connections only need be strong enough, also ﬁts
nicely with work on informal inference within the New Paradigm (e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Mercier & Sperber, 2011).
At this stage of theoretical development, we do not have an over-arching formal theory (Marr’s computational level of analysis) to
model the subjective strength of inferential connections within conditionals. Hahn and Oaksford’s Bayesian model of informal in-
ference is a good candidate, but by no means the only one. It is entirely possible that diﬀerent models are needed to account for
inferential connections within diﬀerent types of conditionals. We relegate to future work an investigation of this possibility. A further
goal will be to link HIT to approaches (e.g., the dual-source model of Singmann, Klauer, & Beller, 2016) that aim to model the
inference process underlying arguments involving conditionals.
Similarly, it is an open question what HIT’s inferential principles imply vis-à-vis the Equation. Recent evidence suggests that the
Equation does not hold for conditionals whose antecedent is not positively probabilistically relevant to their consequent (Skovgaard-
Olsen et al., 2016). Whether and to what extent the Equation holds under diﬀerent types of inferential connections still needs to be
explored. We ﬂag this here as another avenue for future research, though see Douven (2017b) for some ﬁrst thoughts on what
18 We thank Mike Oaksford for this suggestion.
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inferentialists might want to say about the Equation.
On the processing side (Marr’s algorithmic level of analysis), HIT takes as a departure point Hypothetical Thinking Theory. This
dual processing model is based on a default-interventionist approach, rather than a parallel-competitive one (Evans, 2007b). The
main diﬀerence between these models of dual processing is the question of whether Type 1 processes precede Type 2 processes
(default-interventionist), or both types of processes proceed in tandem from the start (parallel-competitive). The evidence is equi-
vocal and fraught with debate (see, e.g., Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011), for example over the question of whether intuitions
about logic and probability exist and, if they do exist, of how to interpret them (for the debate concerning logical intuitions see, e.g.,
De Neys, 2012; and cf. Klauer & Singmann, 2013). Going into the debate in any detail is beyond the scope of this work. For now we
just note that, although HIT is compatible with the default-interventionist model, it would be easy enough to ﬁt it with the parallel-
competitive model. For example, the notion of default processes can be replaced with its closely related counterpart from the parallel-
competitive model, the concept of fast, shallow Type 2 processing (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). Similarly, the idea of intuitive logic
can be easily subsumed—and even further developed—under HIT’s suggestion that, by default, people interpret conditionals as
postulating an inferential connection between their antecedent and consequent, where that connection may involve (but is not
limited to) deductive, inductive, or abductive inference (or any combination of these).
This is also the place to note that, even within the New Paradigm, there is some debate over the if-heuristic and how explanatory it
can be considered to be (e.g., Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). One potential explanation of our ﬁndings is that the contrast class in our
paradigm is restricted to the other 13 stimuli in the series (be they color patches or spheres), whereas in everyday conditionals this is
not so obviously the case.19 However, note that the contrast class in Experiment 3’s between-series conditions was also restricted
(albeit to 27 other stimuli rather than 13), yet relevance was still suppressed. We defer further exploration of this issue to future work.
The design of Experiment 4 was partly inspired by another recent development within the New Paradigm, research in meta-
cognition and meta-reasoning (e.g., Ackerman & Thompson, 2015, 2017a, 2017b; Thompson et al., 2011, 2013). The departure point
for meta-reasoning research is that Type 2 processes require cognitive eﬀort, whereas people tend to be cognitively lazy. The question
then arises what regulatory mechanism triggers this extra cognitive eﬀort. Meta-reasoning research focuses mainly on “Feeling of
Rightness,” or FOR—the metacognitive experience whose function is to signal when additional cognitive resources are necessary.
FOR is usually measured by asking participants how conﬁdent they are in their responses. This was the measure that Experiment 3
borrowed from this line of research. Meta-reasoning research, however, usually employs the “two-response paradigm”: participants
are asked to provide an initial fast response, followed by conﬁdence rating, and then a slower, more considered response to the same
task, again followed by conﬁdence rating. The term FOR is reserved for the ﬁrst conﬁdence rating, whereas the ﬁnal conﬁdence rating
is termed “Final Judgment of Conﬁdence”, or FJC (e.g., Thompson et al., 2011, 2013).
We should clarify that, although we used a metacognitive measure, Experiment 4 did not aim to explore a metacognitive research
question. Metacognitive research is about regulatory processes, whereas our research question focused on the diverse inferential
connections that may exist between a conditional’s antecedent and consequent, and on the nature of those connections. Meta-
reasoning inspired our work, providing a convenient measure, which together with inference strength captured the essence of
bounded inference. But we did not employ the two-response paradigm, which was beside the point for the purposes of the current
study. Accordingly, we avoided using the terms associated with this paradigm (FOR, FJC), referring instead to “metacognitive
conﬁdence” simpliciter. The nature of the metacognitive processes underlying HIT is a pertinent research question. We have not
addressed it at this stage as it was beyond the scope of this study; it still awaits future work. Potential studies in this vein must draw
on the two-response paradigm, where both FOR and FJC can provide valuable clues to the nature of the processes underlying the
appreciation of inferential connections within conditionals. Another potentially useful angle, strongly related to satisﬁcing, is the idea
of a “stopping rule” (Ackerman, 2014): the metacognitive mechanism which determines when the goal of the inference has been
attained.
A good theory of conditionals is the Holy Grail for the psychology of reasoning as well as for philosophical logic. As two minimal
desiderata, such a theory should cover both empirical evidence and semantic intuition. With this paper, we have taken some ﬁrst
steps toward incorporating a hitherto neglected semantic intuition into a psychological theory of conditionals.
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